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The notion of software code replacing legal code as a mecha-
nism to control human behavior--"code as law"-is often
illustrated with examples in intellectual property and freedom of
speech. This Article examines the neglected issue of the impact
of "code as law" on privacy. To what extent is privacy-related
"code" being used, either to undermine or to enhance privacy?
On the basis of cases in the domains of law enforcement, na-
tional security, E-government, and commerce, it is concluded
that technology rarely incorporates specific privacy-related
norms. At the same time, however, technology very often does
have clear effects on privacy, as it affects the "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy." Technology usually makes privacy violations
easier Particularly information technology is much more a tech-
nology of control than it is a technology of freedom. Privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) have yet to be implemented on
any serious scale. The consequent eroding effect of technology
on privacy is a slow, hardly perceptible process. If one is to stop
this almost natural process, a concerted effort is called for, pos-
sibly in the form of "privacy impact assessments," enhanced
control mechanisms, and awareness-raising.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Panoptic Panoramas
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham, the English utilitarian philosopher, wor-
ried over the moral state of his times, devised an architectural design for
a prison that he called the Panopticon. This Panopticon has stood as a
model of ultimate surveillance ever since, and is, hence, connected to the
concept of privacy. The Panopticon is a hemispherical building. On the
outer perimeter there are a number of levels, each containing cells for the
inmates. The individual cells are completely isolated from each other,
making it impossible for the inmates to see or hear the other prisoners. In
the middle of the Panopticon is the office of the Inspector. The Inspector
can see and hear every individual prisoner, but the prisoners cannot see
the Inspector. One can imagine that this requires complicated structures,
and one can even doubt whether it could have been constructed in
Bentham's times at all.
The principal idea of the Panopticon is that inmates are under poten-
tial scrutiny of the Inspector at all times. The Inspector has the capacity
to see and hear all inmates and to command them individually, day and
night. The strength of the Panopticon is not so much that the Inspector
can issue commands and monitor the inmate but the illusion that he
could. As the point of the Panopticon is discipline or training,' the con-
stant illusion of monitoring and inmates' fear of punishment for
transgressions means that they learn the rules quickly and behave ac-
cordingly. That, at least, is the idea.
In Bentham's view, the idea of the Panopticon could not only be
used as a model for prisons, but also for asylums, workplaces, and
schools, to name but a few areas. Bentham carried a social mission to
improve society, and seeing without being seen plays an important role
in accomplishing this goal.
Not surprisingly, the Panopticon has become a metaphor for total
surveillance. Whereas the actual implementation of the Panopticon was
not very realistic in Bentham's times, today it is becoming increasingly
so. Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) cameras are appearing everywhere, in
both private and public places. Although these cameras increasingly are
operated by private enterprises, many are state-controlled. They are often
placed more or less with Benthamite goals in mind, such as the increase
of public safety ("Big brother is watching out for you" instead of "Big
brother is watching you") 2 and compliance with speed regulations.
1. See REGINALD WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: How TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS
BECOMING A REALITY 33 (1999).
2. Id. at 141.
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Completely in line with panoptic logic, there may not be anyone actually
watching the camera shots or the cameras may lack film. It is the
possibility of being caught that is part of their effect. The illusion of an
omnipresent inspector keeps the subjects in line.
The Internet offers excellent opportunities for even further-reaching
forms of surveillance. Boyle,3 following Foucault's analysis of the Pan-
opticon,4 concludes that the state is creating an Internet Panopticon:
"[T]he state has worked actively to embed or hardwire the legal regime
in the technology itself."5 An interesting aspect of this Internet Panopti-
con is that the state shifts the responsibility of enforcement to entities in
the private sector, such as Internet service providers (ISPs).
"In the meantime private entities are happily creating their own in-
dependent Panopticons. 6 Businesses are collecting and processing vast
amounts of personal data for different, but not all too different, reasons
than the state does. In a sense, private-sector enterprises use monitoring
and surveillance to have people behave the way they want. "[C]ustomers
are disciplined by consumption itself to obey the rules, to be 'good' not
because it is morally preferable to being 'bad' but because there is no
conceivable alternative to being good, other than being put outside the
reach of benefits."7 Coercion in this private Panopticon is replaced by
consent, but the prevailing characteristics of panoptic logic remain.
Thus, both the state and the private sector engage in surveillance of
people's lives. And while the motives and means vary, both public and
private systematic prying into people's privacy raises serious legal and
ethical questions.
B. Technology, Privacy, and Lessig's Code
The Panopticon relies heavily on technology. Especially Information
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) offer almost unlimited possi-
bilities to facilitate perfect surveillance and monitoring, thereby invading
people's privacy. Partly as a result of the rise of the network society,
some authors have already proclaimed privacy dead. Book and article
titles have included the phrases "the death of privacy"8 and "the end of
3. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997).
4. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON [DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON] 197-229 (1975).
5. Boyle, supra note 3, at 188.
6. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 853
(2000), available at http://www.paulschwartz.net/bibliography.html.
7. WHITAKER, supra note 1, at 142.
8. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000);
SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(1999).
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privacy."'9 Or, as Scott McNeally, Sun Microsystems' CEO, proclaimed
after Intel acknowledged that they were able to track people through
their new Pentium III chip in 1999, "You already have zero privacy ....
Get over it."' Both the influence of technology and the fact that people
seem to care less about privacy have been considered factors warranting
the statement that privacy is no longer feasible, or relevant, or neither of
these.
In this Article, we intend to analyze this impact of technology on pri-
vacy. We do so by following Lawrence Lessig's argument in the privacy
chapter of his Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace." Lessig argues that
"the code [technology] has already upset a traditional balance. It has al-
ready changed the control that individuals have over facts about their
private lives.' 2 He illustrates this with several privacy-threatening tech-
nologies. After an analysis of different conceptions of privacy and
arguments for and against privacy protection, Lessig presents a response
to privacy-threatening technology: privacy-enhancing technology (PET).
That is, in Lessig's view, "code" that disturbs the traditional balance be-
tween privacy and other interests should be checked by "code" that
incorporates privacy values. This latter notion can be seen as an instance
of what Reidenberg had earlier termed lex informatica: software and
hardware that regulate themselves, or rather, Internet users and develop-
ers who regulate themselves through technology.'3 Although we do not
intend to analyze and criticize Lessig's chapter on code and privacy spe-
cifically, a rigorous discourse requires a closer look at Lessig's analysis
of the impact of code on privacy and the solution he presents in order to
get a better understanding of the matter.
Lessig considers privacy from a conventional point of view: privacy
equals information privacy-a right to control one's personal data (pri-
vacy control). This notion of information privacy is generally thought to
be introduced by Westin in his epoch-making study Privacy and Free-
dom, 4 and many authors shared his thoughts, including Jerry Kang, '5
9. CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY (1999); see WHITAKER, supra note 1.
10. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: Get Over It, WIRED.COM, Jan. 26, 1999, http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17538,00.html.
11. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142-63 (1999).
12. Id. at 142.
13. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1998). Reidenberg had already pointed
out this development much earlier, in his seminal 1993 paper, Rules of the Road for Global
Electronic Highways: Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287
(1993).
14. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
15. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1195-98 (1998).
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Fred Cate, 16 and Robert Post.'7 Privacy is undermined by ICTs as they
allow for electronic surveillance and the collection of personal data.
These activities are problematic to Lessig for two reasons: manipulation
and loss of equality. The first problem is that the collection of personal
data leads to profiling. The profiles constructed on the basis of initial
data are used to "normalize the population of which the norm is
drawn."" This is done by presenting only the options the profiler wants
the person fitting a particular profile to see. Obviously, this scheme
works best if the profiled is unaware of this selective feed of options.
This kind of manipulation affects people's autonomy to make choices.
The second risk Lessig sees in modem data collection is diminished
equality. He argues that people in the private space were relatively equal
as a result of the relative anonymity of these spaces and the fact that
transactions could take place in relative anonymity as well. 9 This equal-
ity explicitly resulted from the fact that information to discriminate was
too costly to acquire. Modem data collection, especially with merging
multiple data sources, makes it possible to discriminate. Lessig exempli-
fies this phenomenon with frequent-flyer programs, which allow airlines
to distinguish between classes of passengers. The profiling in this case is
not too severe, as airline passengers are aware of the existence of fre-
quent-flyer programs which everyone can join. A more convincing
example of the pressure on equality posed by profiling is the opaque dif-
ferentiation in types of customers that, for instance, was done by the
online bookstore, Amazon, who presented different prices for DVDs on
the basis of the kind of browser used, whether one was a first-time or a
repeat customer, or which ISP the customer used. 20
Lessig's solution to these threats is a two-tier system: code and
property law. Lessig equates privacy with information privacy; hence,
restoring people's control over their personal data is the logical approach
to address the imbalance technology has caused. Instead of calling for
legal measures, such as fair information practices, Lessig seeks the solu-
tion in technology: privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs). He embraces
the idea of software implementing our privacy preferences: an electronic
butler, who negotiates privacy protection on our behalf'-a notion that
builds on the World Wide Web Consortium's Platform for Privacy Pref-
16. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1997).
17. See Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957 (1989).
18. LESSIG, supra note 11, at 154.
19. See id. at 154-55.
20. Linda Rosencrance, Amazon Charging Different Prices on Some DVDs,
COMP. WORLD, Sept. 5, 2000, http://www.computerworld.com/industrytopics/retail/story/
0,10801,49569,00.html.
21. See LESSIG, supra note 11, at 160.
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erences (P3P) Project.2  The electronic butler implements negotiating
power. But what if the other party simply ignores the negotiations and
proceeds to collect and use personal data without a person's consent?
Lessig's solution to this problem is to define personal data as property
and, hence, introduce property law as the regime to protect people's per-
sonal data. The advantage of relying on property law over data
protection law lies in the fact that property law facilitates ex ante control
over personal data: only after consent, may personal data be used. Obvi-
ously the consent will only be given at the right price.23
This brief summary of Lessig's chapter on code and privacy identi-
fies Lessig's claims:
" privacy equals information privacy;
* code upsets the privacy balance;
* personal data should be considered a property right; and
* code and property law should be used to restore the privacy
balance.24
Lessig and others' analysis of privacy as control of personal data that
should be treated as a property right is contested.2' Nevertheless, it ex-
emplifies an essentially American way of looking at privacy and privacy
threats in the sense that it relies on market principles and self-regulation
of private parties. The government is to abstain from interfering. In con-
trast, we can place a European (continental) approach with government
regulation for the fair treatment of personal data. In this Article, we will
not delve into too much detail on the debate over the various privacy
conceptions, but we do need a better grasp on the concept of privacy to
understand the impact of code on privacy. To this end, Lessig's most im-
portant claims are that code upsets the traditional privacy balance and
that "code" can be used to restore this balance.
C. Research Questions and Overview
In this Article we try answer the following questions:
* Is privacy-related regulation being implemented in code?
* What (kind of) rules are embedded in this code?
22. P3P Public Overview, http://www.w3.org/P3P/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
23. See Ronald H. Coase, Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
24. See LESSIG, supra note 11, at 141-63.
25. See infra Part VII.
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" What are the problems associated with this embedding of
rules?
* Does "code" indeed induce shifts in privacy balances?
" What could and should be done, by whom and when, to ad-
dress these problems?
Here, we make a terminological distinction between code and
"code." With code, we denote software and hardware generally. 26 "Code,"
however, denotes software and hardware that function as a set of norma-
tive rules. That is, we use "code" when we refer to an ICT that
incorporates certain normative elements, which serve to guide or control
(what is perceived as) proper and acceptable behavior. We shall thus dis-
tinguish throughout this Article between ICT in general (code) or ICT
that embeds certain norms or values ("code")."
In answering the research questions we will look at both the public
and the private sphere, since the panoptic state seems to be emerging in
both. Both public and private entities make use of privacy-threatening
technologies for different purposes and by different means. Privacy is
not an absolute right, and intrusion of the private sphere is sometimes
warranted. The interests of all parties involved have to be balanced. We
will argue that different privacy balances exist in the various domains
and that the impact of code on privacy should be assessed with respect to
the particular domain. In other words, whether breaches of privacy are
justified is context-specific, since privacy means different things in dif-
ferent contexts. Apart from the threats to privacy, we also try to indicate
potential solutions to these threats.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss a
number of relevant notions with respect to privacy. We look at both the
European perspective on privacy, which can be said to focus on dignity,
and the U.S. perspective, which can be said to be liberty-oriented.28 In
Part III, we discuss developments on privacy and code in four domains,
both in the public and private sphere. Part IV sums up the effects of
"code" on privacy that emerge from this case analysis, which we then
26. We use code rather than the general term "technology" since we focus on informa-
tion and communication technologies rather than technology in a broad sense.
27. This is what Lessig generally means when he speaks of "code:' as in the title of his
book: "The software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is constitute a set of con-
straints on how you can behave." LESSIG, supra, note 11, at 89. However, he also uses "code"
in the more neutral sense: for instance, where he writes that code has already upset the tradi-
tional privacy balance, he uses the term "code" not to denote software and hardware in a
normative sense, but in the neutral sense to mean software code or, more generally, to indicate
a vague notion of technology. See id. at 142.
28. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Lib-
erty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=476041.
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analyze in Part V according to basic questions that the notion of "code as
law" raises. Next, in Part VI, we try and pinpoint the main problems at
stake, and we conclude in Part VII tentatively looking at options for ac-
tions to address these problems.
II. PRIVACY
A. Concepts of Privacy
Many articles and books on privacy have noted that privacy is a slip-
pery notion, often and easily used, but its precise meaning is far from
clear. This is not surprising, nor is it problematic: the nature of value
notions is that they are not precisely delineated. In fact, privacy may be a
clearer and more concise concept than, for instance, autonomy or lib-
erty. 29 So, what does privacy amount to? What is it that can be assaulted
by "code"?
Many accounts of privacy take a theoretical approach in the sense
that they try to define privacy from a philosophical, ethical, or moral
point of view. 0 They are not primarily concerned with protecting or
regulating privacy by means of legal instruments like legislation. Other
accounts focus on the implementation of privacy provisions in legislation
or the way courts handle privacy issues.3' Yet others address both the
theoretical and practical legal aspects of privacy. And they do this for
good reasons. Society is changing, and cases arise all the time that do
not adequately fit the current legal doctrine. Such hard cases, as they are
called, give rise to reflection upon the principles on which a particular
legal doctrine is founded. In our field of study, "code" and privacy, this is
especially apparent. We are not particularly interested in the cases that
remain within the boundaries of ordinary data-protection law, for in-
stance. We are interested in the cases that make us frown-the cases that
give rise to consider changing legislation or legal theory. Hence we need
to look at both the current legal practice and the principles and theory
underlying the concept of privacy. We start our little tour of the concept
of privacy reviewing the various discussions that have taken place, and
are still taking place, with respect to privacy.
29. Cf PETER BLOK, HET RECHT OP PRIVACY [THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY] (2002).
30. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968) (arguing "privacy is not
just one possible means among others to insure some other value, but ... it is necessarily
related to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and
trust"); WESTIN, supra note 14; James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 323 (1975).
31. See, e.g., LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATION-
ALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS (2002).
32. See, e.g., BLOK, supra note 29.
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Bygrave offers a distinction in four major ways in which the concept
of privacy is defined that is useful for our analysis.33 The first group of
definitions takes non-interference as its starting point, a conceptualiza-
tion highly influenced by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' seminal
1890 paper, The Right to Privacy: The Implicit Made Explicit.34 Warren
and Brandeis saw the right to privacy as part and parcel of "a right to be
let alone," and "the existing law affords a principle which may be in-
voked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion ... by the
too enterprising press."35 People, for example, should not be photo-
graphed by the press at its whim, unless they choose to "go public"
themselves.
The second group of definitions centers on the degree of access to a
person. Ruth Gavison gave an influential and popular definition in this
category, 36 which defined the amount of access to a person on three di-
mensions: secrecy (the amount of information about a person), solitude
(the amount of physical access to a person), and anonymity (the amount
of attention given to a person). Privacy in Gavison's perception is a nor-
matively neutral, instrumental concept.
37
A third group sees privacy in terms of information control. Westin, 8
Fried, 39 Rachels,4 and also Lessig4' belong to this group. Some quotes
can illustrate their position. Westin considers privacy to be "an instru-
ment for achieving individual goals of self realization" and defines it as
"being in a position to determine for [oneself], when, how, and to what
extent information about [oneself] is communicated to others.4 2 Fried
and Rachels echoed his definition of privacy: "the control we have over
information about ourselves"; 43 "our ability to control who has access to
us.
44
The fourth definition group relates privacy closely to intimate or
sensitive information. Julie Inness promotes this privacy concept: "pri-
vacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions,
which includes decisions about intimate access, intimate information,
33. BYGRAVE, supra note 31, at 128-29.
34. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy: The Implicit Made
Explicit, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
35. Id. at 206.
36. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
37. See id. at 423.
38. See WESTIN, supra note 14.
39. See Fried, supra note 30.
40. See Rachels, supra note 30.
41. See LESSIG, supra note 11.
42. WESTIN, supra note 14, at 7.
43. Fried, supra note 30, at 482.
44. Rachels, supra note 30, at 326.
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and intimate actions." 5 This may also enhance personal expression and
choice.
B. Privacy Laws
As privacy has found its way into all sorts of statutes and is the sub-
ject of much case law, there is also a large body of knowledge on how
society and the courts should cope with privacy.
The way privacy is incorporated in positive law depends on legal
traditions. In the U.S. common-law system, privacy provisions are scat-
tered over many statutes and acts. The Constitution and the Bill of
Rights are, of course, important, as they establish constitutional rights
and privacy might qualify as such a right. Privacy as such, however, is
not explicitly mentioned in either the Constitution or the Amendments.
Though not explicitly mentioned, Warren and Brandeis could argue that
a right to privacy exists. ' A combination of Amendments, including the
Third,47 Fourth,48 Fifth,49 Tenth ° and Fourteenth Amendments,5 and pos-
sibly the First,52 is generally seen to cover the basic aspects of privacy.1
3
Apart from the constitutional provisions, privacy law in the U.S. is
sectoral. Many sectoral acts contain privacy provisions. Examples can be
found at the federal level, for instance,54 in Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 on wiretapping,55 the Privacy
Act of 1974,56 the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 57 the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,"s the Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988,"9 the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
1998, ° and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.61 At the
45. JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 140 (1992).
46. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 34.
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
53. Justice Douglas, for instance, upheld this idea in his famous "penumbra" argument
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965).
54. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy
(What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 26, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/
Articles/01_STLR_1/index.htm.
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000).
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (establishing a legal framework for the records col-
lected by the federal government).
57. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (2000) (cable television).
58. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (2000) (amended 1988) (electronic mail).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000) (video rental records).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2000) (lie detectors).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000) (auto-dialers and junk faxes).
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state level, there are many more. Rotenberg argues that these sectoral
laws, and the privacy provisions therein, are the result of new technolo-
gies entering the market and the need to regulate new technologies'
intrusive monitoring.62
In the European Continental tradition, there is a history of privacy
protection, both in the various constitutions, as well as in various na-
tional laws resulting from their implementation of European Community
Directives.63 The cornerstone of European privacy protection is Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR), which states:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.64
This provision establishes the core of privacy protection by protecting
private life and specifies three particular spheres: home, family, and cor-
respondence. This core and these spheres are associated with three types
of privacy-protection measures.
1. Physical Privacy is the protection of people's physical bodies
against invasive procedures-such as genetic tests, drug test-
ing, and body searches (bodily privacy)-as well as the
setting of limits on intrusion into the home and other physical
environments-such as the workplace 65 (territorial privacy).
This covers searches, video surveillance, and other forms of
monitoring.
2. Relational Privacy is both the security and privacy of com-
munications-such as mail, telephones, e-mail, and direct
62. Rotenberg, supra note 54, in 27-28.
63. See, for example, the EC Data Protection Directive. Council Directive No. 95/46,
1990 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at http://www.dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DoclD=93.
64. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms [ECHR], art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
65. The workplace can also be protected by Article 8 of the ECHR. See id.; see, e.g.,
Niemitz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 97 (1992); Halford v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. Ct. H.R. 523 (1997).
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communication-and the privacy of personal or intimate rela-
tionships-such as family life.
3. Informational Privacy, included in the private life and espe-
cially developed in the EC Data Protection Directive,66 is the
protection of informational privacy. This protection involves
the establishment of rules governing the collection and han-
dling of personal data-such as credit information and
medical and government records.
C. The Privacy Balance and Reasonable Expectations
Is privacy an absolute right? Although some claim it is, or at least go
a long way in this direction, no one effectively claims that privacy is
completely inviolable. Considerations of the common good can justify
breaches of privacy. A balance is required between privacy and other in-
terests, and-particularly with sensitive interests such as law
enforcement and national security-this balance has always been a pre-
carious one that seems to be contested continually.
Etzioni,67 for instance, claims that privacy is overvalued and that a
new balance has to be found between privacy and other values. "We need
to treat privacy as an individual right that is to be balanced with concerns
for the common good-or as one good among others, without a priori
privileging any of them. 68 Bearing in mind that he wrote this before
9/11, the view that privacy should not be "privileged" has since gained
wider acclaim.
In the European context, the privacy balance is essentially struck
through the second paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR. 69 Breaches of
privacy are allowed if they are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety, or the economic well-being
of the country and for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. This means that a privacy violation has to be proportional to its
goals, and the goal cannot be attainable by another, less infringing meas-
ure. Moreover, the breach of privacy has to be "in accordance with the
law" and, hence, has to be sufficiently clear and foreseeable so that citi-
zens are able to know in what circumstances their privacy may be violated.
These criteria of legality, legitimacy, subsidiarity, and proportionality are
also embedded in the fair information-processing standards set by EC Di-
rectives and implemented in national data-protection legislation in the EU
66. See 1990 O.J. (L 281) 31.
67. ARMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999).
68. Id. at 4.
69. See ECHR, supra note 64, art. 8(2).
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member states. As such, balancing the various interests is inherent to the
European data-protection regime."
In the U.S. context, an important concept in assessing the right to
privacy is that of "reasonable expectation." This concept was introduced
in U.S. case law in the light of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
"unreasonable searches and seizures.' In 1968, the Supreme Court, in
Katz v. United States, 2 held unconstitutional the federal authorities' un-
warranted placement of an electronic listening device on the outside of a
public phone booth to record a phone conversation. Justice Harlan
wrote that the protected zone under the Fourth Amendment is defined by
the individual's "actual," subjective expectation of privacy, to the extent
to which that expectation is "one that society [was] prepared to recog-
nize as reasonable. 74 In a large number of cases, the reasonable
expectation of privacy has been the test to decide whether the govern-
ment has unconstitutionally breached someone's privacy. Thus,
reasonable expectations of privacy can exist "in homes, businesses,
sealed luggage and packages, .. . but no reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy were found in bank records, voice or writing samples, phone
numbers, and automobile passenger compartments, trunks and glove
boxes."75
Reasonable expectations of privacy as such do not play a role in the
continental concept of privacy, as justified breaches of privacy are cov-
ered in Article 8(2) of the ECHR.76 The concept, nevertheless, plays a
role in the European outlook on privacy. The balancing test to determine
when a privacy violation is necessary in a democratic society, after all,
depends on the seriousness of the privacy violation, which in turn relies,
to a certain extent, on the way or amount of privacy people experience in
the particular context. This is one of the reasons why a closer look at the
relation between technology and privacy is warranted. People will gen-
erally base their online expectations on offline experiences and will
expect to have the same level of protection online as they have offline. In
the case of new, privacy-invasive technologies, the user will have a false
expectation of privacy. Hence, the use of such technologies will be con-
sidered a greater violation of privacy. This requires the interest served by
70. See PAUL DE HERT, PRIVACY EN HET GEBRUIK VAN VISUELE TECHNIEKEN DOOR
BURGER EN POLITIE [PRIVACY AND THE USE OF VISUAL TECHNOLOGIES BY CITIZENS AND
POLICE] (1998).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
73. See id. at 348, 359.
74. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
75. See CATE, supra note 16, at 57 (internal quotes omitted) (footnote omitted).
76. ECHR, supra note 64, art. 8(2).
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infringing the privacy of the user to have more weight if such a use is to
be allowed under the balancing test of Article 8(2) of the ECHR.7"
D. An Example: Webcasting
To illustrate how new technologies affect privacy adversely and how
a loss in actual privacy may lead to shifts in reasonable privacy expecta-
tions or in the balance of privacy and other interests, we shall describe a
prototypical case: webcasting or webradio."
One of the problems with technology and privacy is that in some in-
stances breaches of privacy occur in situations where the users of the
technology are unaware of the possible breaches because they expect to
have privacy. Radio, and later television, was originally broadcast over
the air as a practical way to reach people in geographically diverse loca-
tions. Anyone with the proper equipment could tune in to a show and
listen to, or view, the audio(visual) content provided by the broadcaster.
As there is no way to monitor who listens to what on broadcast radio, the
technology does not affect people's privacy. This changed with the intro-
duction of cable networks in the 1970s and advances in content
encryption. These means provided content providers with more control
over their audience, and it opened the way to subscription-based broad-
casting and pay-per-view models. The different types of subscription
models have different effects on the privacy of the users. Whereas a sub-
scription model generally provides information only on the channels to
which a subscriber subscribes, a pay-per-view model implies insight into
the programs to which a subscriber listened. This data, by virtue of being
relatable to subscriber data, does impact people's privacy.
The Internet has become an important channel for the delivery of
audiovisual content in ways that resemble the traditional radio and tele-
vision broadcasting. Streaming-media protocols, such as the Real Time
Streaming Protocol (RTSP) 9 and Real-Time Protocol (RTP),80 enable
anyone with a broadband Internet connection to set up on-demand deliv-
ery of real-time data, both audio and video, in live data feeds or stored
clips. Delivery can take place either unicast, in which the client chooses
77. In the European Union, that is. See id.
78. Recently, one form of webcasting has been popularly dubbed "podcasting" in refer-
ence to the recipient's ability to download the media to a portable player (like an iPod) so she
can enjoy the media at the most convenient time. See Podcasting, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/podcasting (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
79. See HENNING SCHULZRINNE ET AL., INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (IETF),
REAL TIME STRAMING PROTOCAL (RTSP) (1998), ftp://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2326.txt.
80. See HENNING SCHULZRINNE ET AL., IETF, RTP: A TRANSPORT PROTOCAL FOR
REAL-TIME APPLICATIONS (1996), ftp://ftp.ietf.org/rfc/rfc 1 889.txt.
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what and when to receive, or multicast, in which every client receives the
same data at the same time.
Listeners or viewers use audio and video players, such as
RealPlayer, Windows Media Player, or iTunes, to connect to a streaming
server. The player requests the server to open a session in which particu-
lar data is streamed to the client. Client and server exchange information
about the location (server and client internet protocol (IP) address) and
the content to be broadcast.
Webradio has become quite popular, and many traditional radio sta-
tions use it as a supplementary service or as a means to reach larger
audiences. But also, thousands of non-professional providers have set up
webradio stations. The popularity of webradio is due to the unprece-
dented number of "radio" stations a listener can access with simple
means: an ordinary PC with a broadband connection (cable or DSL).
The fact that a client and server exchange data for the proper func-
tioning of the service does not necessarily affect the privacy of the
listeners. As long as no logs are kept, there are no privacy issues per se.
The catch in this case relates to the content provided. Most material
broadcast is copyrighted material, and, hence, webradio or webcasting
touches upon copyright law. Although it is being debated whether web-
casters are to pay license fees and to whom-the artists or the record
industry, the case has been settled in many countries." Webcasters gen-
erally need a license agreement with the copyright holder or the
representatives of the copyright holders, such as the SENA in the Nether-
lands, for instance. The webcaster has to pay remuneration for each track
(song) streamed for each listener.1
2
This royalty-payment scheme, made possible by the technology, dif-
fers from that of traditional over-the-air radio. Traditional radio-
broadcast license fees are based on estimates of the number of listeners
of a particular radio station. Webradio allows for a much more precise
scheme, because the listener's mediaplayer, iTunes for instance, requests
a particular webradio station to start streaming content to the client. The
webcaster therefore knows exactly which clients tune in to its broadcast,
when, and for how long. This facilitates the production of exact data on
the number of clients tuned in on each track streamed by the webcaster.
Webcasters are obliged to produce this data in their quarterly reports to
rights-holders. Accordingly, the webcasters keep detailed listener logs,
containing the date and time a particular client has tuned in and out of
particular stations, as well as the client's IP address. IP addresses can be
81. See, e.g., Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F3d 485 (3d Cir. 2003).
82. In the Netherlands, the fee in 2004 was E 0.00084 per track per listener. In the U.S.,
it was $0.0007 in 2002.
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traced back to individuals in some instances and, thus, can be identifi-
ers.83 Consequently, data maintained by webcasters can be used for
monitoring and profiling listeners.
For a hypothetical user, Ronald, his privacy could be impacted by
listening to a webcast of music. An individual webcaster of, say, Low-
lands Jazz, may be able to infer information from the patterns Ronald's
computer leaves in the webcaster's listeners log. It may tell something
about Ronald's taste because he tends to tune in to another station (un-
known to the LowLands Jazz station) at moments that suggest his taste
to be the motivator (for instance, after a couple of notes or the start of a
new program). Or, it may reveal something about his living habits if pat-
terns occur in the times he tunes in to the station (such as, usually on
weekends rather than working days, except Tuesdays, which turns out to
be his day off). The impact on the listener's privacy increases if various
listener logs are merged, especially if they are combined with other
online traces, like website logs, which also contain IP addresses.
Most people are aware of the fact that IP addresses are logged when
they surf the internet. But are they aware that webcasters also collect
data on their use of the service? Of old, one could listen to over-the-air
radio anonymously, and many people will expect webcasting not to de-
part from this idea. Yet, it does. The webradio listener is monitored, and
the data collected, in principle, can be used for other purposes than re-
muneration.
How should we assess this example? Webcasting as a species of "ra-
dio" introduces a shift in the privacy balance. Listening to broadcast
radio is no longer completely anonymous if done through webradio.
What can justify this diminishment of privacy? If we apply Etzioni's
(communitarian) test, 4 then clearly there is no well-documented and mac-
roscopic threat to the common good; the listeners log is just a convenient
way to meet financial or economic needs. Because IP addresses are
unique, they provide convenient metering units. Is this enough to warrant
the diminishing of the privacy protection? Not necessarily, especially if
83. See Dutch Data Protection Authority, Een IP-adres is niet altijd een persoons-
gegeven [An IP-Address Is Not Always a Real Person], http://www.cbpweb.nl/documenten/
uitz2000-0340.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2004).
84. ETZIONI, supra note 67, at 183-215, proposes a test for determining whether pri-
vacy and the common good are out of balance. Privacy should be limited only if society is
threatened by a well-documented and macroscopic threat. If this test is passed, one should
consider if these threats can be countered without first resorting to measures that might restrict
privacy. The measures introduced should be minimally intrusive, and measures that treat unde-
sirable side-effects of needed privacy-diminishing measures are to be preferred over those that
ignore these effects. Privacy-diminishing measures in Etzioni's view should therefore be nec-
essary, which resembles the European continental notion of finality; they should be in accord
with the subsidiarity principle (as a last resort) and be proportional (minimally intrusive). Id.
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there are less intrusive ways to measure the number of listeners at any
give time.
Nevertheless, it may well be that the new privacy infringement goes
unnoticed or unheeded by the public and government at large, thereby de
facto establishing a new-lower-privacy standard. Perhaps as people
get used to being "watched" by webradio, they will no longer mind that
this affects their personal lives, and they will not regard as reasonable an
expectation of privacy when listening to webradio.
E. A Contextual-Functional Perspective
We have discussed some ways of looking at privacy, both from a
theoretical and from a legal point of view. One of its central characteris-
tics, also emerging from the example of webcasting, is the notion of
reasonable expectations or the balancing test. This indicates that privacy
is a living, continually changing thing, a fluid concept, dependent on
socio-cultural factors.
With respect to these socio-cultural factors, Whitman wrote: "What
must be hidden before the eyes of others, seems to differ from society to
society."" In a recent paper, he discusses two western cultures of pri-
vacy.86 The European culture on the one hand, has the "protection of a
right to respect and personal dignity at its core. The continental Euro-
pean privacy rights are rights to one's image, name, and reputation, and
what Germans call the right to informational self-determination ....
On the other hand, the U.S. tradition is oriented toward "values of lib-
erty, and especially liberty against the state."88 This emphasis on liberty
is in line with the traditional American, fearful pre-occupation with state
intrusions, especially in one's own home. 89 These differences in core val-
ues have consequences as to what should be protected against intrusion.
In continental Europe, credit-card reporting, for instance is seen as a
"dangerous exposure of private life to most Europeans" 9 and is governed
by strict regulation; whereas in the U.S., it is common practice. Dignity
in the continental mind is no less important than market efficiency.9'
Also, workplace e-mail and consumer data are deemed much more wor-
85. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1161.
86. See id.; Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000), available at http://
reidenberg.home.sprynet.com/intemational-rules.pdf (comparing the U.S. and European ap-
proaches to privacy).
87. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1161 ("the right to control the sorts of information
disclosed about oneself') (footnote omitted).
88. Id.
89. See id. at 1161-62.
90. Id. at 1192.
91. Id. at 1192-94.
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thy of protection in continental Europe than in the U.S. 92 Whitman also
notes examples where U.S. privacy protection is much stronger than con-
tinental protection. Phone wiretapping by the police in many European
countries occurs much more frequently than in the U.S., and is perfectly
legal.93 Another continental interference with private affairs that may
strike Americans as odd is the fact that judges can intervene with respect
to the name parent's give their newborn baby.94
Not only is there a difference in what is deemed suitable for protec-
tion under the guise of privacy between societies, but each society's
concept also changes over time.95 Societal changes such as changing atti-
tudes with respect to moral standards, to clothing, and to behavior are
well described.96 Most dramatic may be the impact of recent terrorist
attacks on privacy notions.
The impact of ICT on the concept of privacy is given ample consid-
eration in research.97 It has almost become commonplace to assert that
developments in the fields of ICT have had a tremendous influence on
policymaking, regulation, and legislation with regard to privacy. But
other factors have been important as well. First, the exponential growth
of ICT applications was situated in an eventful socio-economic context.
In many countries, a new demarcation of the private and public sectors
of society has taken place, a process that is going on still. The privatiza-
tion and semi-privatization of formerly public or semi-public institutions
have changed ideas about the permissibility of all kinds of ways in
which personal data is used. Second, past decades witnessed growing
internationalization, not to say globalization, of what were formerly
merely local or national activities. This has sharpened the exchange of
different views on and usages of privacy, for instance, between Europe
and the United States. All of these factors-technological developments,
socio-economic changes, and the fading importance of national bounda-
ries-have influenced the regulation of privacy, and they have
92. See id. at 1194-95.
93. See id. at 1158-59.
94. Such a case arose when French parents decided to call their daughter "Mdgane
Renaud," pronounced the same as Renault Mdgane, a popular French car at the time. Although
the courts ultimately decided not to overrule the parents, they could have done so. See id. at
1217 (citing CA Rennes, 6e ch., May 4, 2000, J.C.P. 2001, IV, 2655, note Pierre & Boizard).
'The court's opinion emphasized that the parents had not any 'arri~res-pensdes'--that is, any
unacknowledged or ulterior intentions, and that the car model in question would likely go out
of production by the time the child reached school age." Id. at 1195 n.324.
95. See, e.g., BARRINGTON MOORE, PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HIs-
TORY (1984).
96. See WESTIN, supra note 14.
97. See, e.g., CATE supra, note 16; Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY
T cH. L.J. 575 (2003); Froomkin, supra note 8; Schwartz, supra note 6.
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contributed to changes in the meaning and significance assigned to pri-
vacy, both by ordinary citizens and by legislatures and policy makers.
In turn, this increasing attention of legislatures and policy makers
towards privacy has led to structural changes in the meaning of privacy.
Law and regulation, through their authoritative status, have had a steer-
ing and enshrining effect on the meaning of privacy and the privacy
discourse.
Johnson nicely summarizes the image we have described so far:
"[p]rivacy is a conventional concept. What is considered private is so-
cially or culturally defined. It varies from context to context, it is
dynamic, and it is quite possible that no single example can be found of
something which is considered private in every culture." 98
This raises the question of how to evaluate the possible influence of
"code" on this fluid notion of privacy without resorting to abstract tru-
isms. Some authors, such as Vedder,99 have proposed a contextual-
functional framework that does justice to the influence of contextual fac-
tors, and-at the same time-enables us to understand how and why the
notion of privacy works in that context. This means that we should de-
part the normative point of privacy and instead take an instrumental
view: privacy is not an end in itself, but merely a means to achieving
other goals. '°° The goals promoted by privacy are abundantly discussed
in literature. For instance, Johnson proposes "personal freedom"; '°' Benn
puts forward a limited set of subdimensions of freedom: the freedom of
self-presentation and moral autonomy.0 2 Such monistic values do not
help us accomplish our goal to make more specific statements and to
transcend the level of abstract truisms. To accomplish this goal, we can
join Vedder, °3 who rejects monistic underlying values and instead pro-
poses that we look at particular contexts to denote the functions and
values of privacy in these contexts. In this view, privacy is an instrumen-
tal value that can serve the fulfillment of various other values, and it
depends on the context just which value privacy enhances. In other
words, privacy serves multiple functions, one or more of which can be
relevant depending on the particular situation.
98. Jeffrey L. Johnson, Privacy and the Judgment of Others, 23 J. VALUE INQUIRY 157,
157 (1989).
99. See A.H. Vedder, Medical Data, New Information Technologies, and the Need for
Normative Principles Other than Privacy Rules, in LAW AND MEDICINE, 441, 447-53 (Mi-
chael Freeman & Andrew Lewis eds., 2000). But cf Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004), available at http://crypto.stanford.edu/
portia/papers/RevnissenbaumDTP31 .pdf.
100. See BYGRAVE, supra note 31, at 125; CATE, supra note 16, at 101-02.
101. Johnson, supra note 98.
102. STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 311-12 (1988).
103. Vedder, supra note 99, at 447-53.
'Code'and the Slow Erosion of Privacy
Therefore, in order to analyze how "code" affects the balance be-
tween privacy and other interests, we look at various fields in which
privacy-related "code" is at work, and try to assess what privacy means
in that specific context. To be able to denote what underlying values and
functions privacy may serve in those particular contexts, we shall outline
some candidates. For our present purposes, a list provided by Bygrave
suffices.' °' This list contains a number of values that recur in the exten-
sive literature on values and interests served by privacy. Bygrave
distinguishes individual and societal values privacy protection serves.
The core individual values follow:
Individuality: Individuality reflects the fact that we want to
see ourselves as individual persons. The protection of indi-
viduality means a protection against flattening out, becoming
one-dimensional. Profiling is a technology that touches upon
this sense of individuality, as it assigns characteristics to indi-
viduals based on characteristics of others.
" Autonomy: This value is related to individuality; it is a per-
son's ability to make his own choices.
" Dignity: Dignity is the right to be shielded against unwanted
public exposure-to be spared embarrassment or humiliation.
Whitman even calls dignity the core of privacy in the conti-
nental tradition.05
" Integrity: This is the right to be taken as a whole. This value is
closely associated with dignity, autonomy, and individuality.
" Emotional release: The release from public roles provides an
individual with an opportunity to be out of the public eye, to
retreat from public role-playing, and to be "herself."
* Self-evaluation: Self-evaluation relates to the time and space
an individual needs to process the information she constantly
gets into a meaningful whole and to reflect on herself and her
position in the world.
" Protected communication: This relates to the notion of being
able to communicate with others confidentially, without run-
ning the risk of being overheard. This value is closely related
to the core U.S. value of freedom (of expression).
1
0
104. See BYGRAVE, supra note 31, at 133-35.
105. Whitman, supra note 28, at 1161.
106. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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For society as a whole, privacy serves important values. Civility, sta-
bility, pluralism, and democracy are central values in this respect. On the
other hand, giving up one's private sphere and disclosing personal data
also has values which are important for society. Walker provided a com-
prehensive list of values of foregoing privacy.'°7
" Cost: Private enterprises aim at profiling customers and value
direct marketing as it may lower their cost of doing business.
In return, they offer discounts and special services to loyal
customers.'08
" Access: Personalization (with preferences derived from a
user's conduct), customization (with preferences derived from
a user's expressed desires), and interactivity (interaction with
a website to obtain a user's tailored content) add value to
online experience and result in repeated access of sites offer-
ing these facilities.'°
" Convenience: Convenience results from the fact that services
can be tailored to particular users or clients thereby focusing
the interaction, for instance, by offering purchase recommen-
dations."0
" Collaboration: Collaboration is important, as some services
can only be offered if sufficient numbers of collaborators ex-
ist. Telephone directories, for instance, only have value if a
sufficient number of telephone subscribers are listed."'
" Community: Community refers to a social need to know the
people one engages with; compare the Cheers opening song,
"You want to go where everybody knows your name."
'" 2
* Security: Security of online transactions can be improved by
means of identification and authentication. Credit-card fraud
can be traced and noticed when credit-card companies have
access to the cardholder's spending history."3
107. Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs
of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2,
http:/stlr.stanford.edu/stlrlarticlesl00_stir2/lindex.htm.
108. See id. R 28-33.
109. See id. if 34-39.
110. See id. I 40-43.
111. See id. I 44-50.
112. See id. U51-61.
113. See id. 62-68.
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• Accountability/responsibility: Anonymous interaction in cy-
berspace is thought to facilitate "wrongs"; it is sometimes
presumed that these wrongs can be prevented if people do not
interact anonymously.' 
14
* Trust: Trust in online relationships can often not be based on
the parties' knowing each other. Sharing personal data
makes it possible to find out more about whether a party is
trustworthy."5
III. "CODE" AND PRIVACY IN CONTEXT
What do we mean by "code" and privacy? The relationship between
"code" and intellectual property is relatively clear." 6 For instance, code
embedded in media players in the form of Digital Rights Management
(DRM) systems makes people conform to the rules the designer of the
media player put forward, who, no doubt, has implemented these in ac-
cordance with the wishes of the rights-holders of the media. "Code" in
this context precludes violations and automates the enforcement of pub-
lic decisions.'
7
The relationship between "code" and privacy is less clear. Obvi-
ously, technology may affect privacy. Technology facilitates monitoring
and surveillance as vaster amounts of personal data can be collected and
processed, thus affecting informational privacy. But can "code" with re-
spect to privacy play a role similar to that in the context of intellectual
property, as exemplified by DRM systems? It can, but there is a discrep-
ancy. Whereas one might see "code" as a threat to privacy, the opposite,
actually, is more likely to be the case. "Code" can be used to prevent
actors and organizations from breaching privacy, just as "code" pre-
cludes violations of copyright law via DRM systems. In the context of
"code" and privacy, "code" has the potential to protect the rights of the
users, whereas in the context of IPR, and also of "code" and speech, it
has the potential to limit the individual's rights.
Privacy-protecting rules can be hardwired within the infrastructure
of the Internet and applications. Two prominent examples are the World
114. See id. U 69-77.
115. See id. H 78-82.
116. See Natali Helberger, Fence on Fence Can: Intellectual Property and Electronic
Self-Regulation, in CODING REGULATION, supra note t, available at http://papers.ssm.con
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=817769.
117. See Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. &
TEH. J. 213, 225-29 (2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=487965.
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Wide Web Consortium's (W3C) projects Platform for Internet Content
Selection (PICS) "'8 and Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P)." 9
PICS allows content providers to add metadata describing the nature of
the content. PICS also allows for filters to be designed that filter content
on the basis of the user's preferences. It was originally intended to help
parents and teachers to determine what children can access on the Inter-
net. But also, privacy-protecting metadata and filters can be assigned.'
20
In this case content providers are required to label their content with
metadata describing their use of data provided by the user. The user's
application (a web browser, for instance) can then decide on the basis of
these labels whether a particular website acts in accordance with her
wishes.
The Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) provides an
automated way for users to gain more control over the use of their per-
sonal information on web sites they visit. Web sites store information
about the way they handle personal information in machine-readable
form (XML). The user stores her own privacy preferences in her
browser, which then compares the website's privacy characteristics with
the user's preferences and decides whether to enter the website or not.
Another example of this kind of embedding policy in code can be
seen in the changes Microsoft made to their ".Net Passport" service as a
result of the objections raised to the original design by the Article 29
Working Party.' Microsoft built the European data privacy protections
directly into the company's technology.
2
This notion of "code" and privacy, where "code" appears to protect
privacy, rather than to infringe upon it, runs counter to what we actually
perceive. This discrepancy exists if we do not separate the different
kinds, or uses, of "code" or technology in general. Technology in many
ways threatens privacy. If we take "code" to indicate technology or code
in a broad sense, it then, by itself, is often privacy-threatening in the
sense that it can be used to invade people's privacy. Taken specifically,
however, as rules built into technology, "code" can be seen as providing
at least as much privacy enhancement as privacy threats.
118. Platform for Internet Content Selection, http://w3.org/PICS (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
119. P3P Public Overview, supra note 22.
120. See, e.g., Jean-Marc Dinant, Using PICS as an Enhanced Privacy Protection Technol-
ogy?, http://www.droit.fundp.ac.be/crid/ecip/pics.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (draft).
121. The Article 29 Working Party is the consortium of the European data-protection super-
visory authorities that monitors compliance with EU data-protection regulation. See Justice &
Home Affairs, Art. 29 Data Protection Working Party, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
justice-home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/index-en.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
122. See Reidenberg, supra note 117, at 218-19; Helen Jung, Microsoft Agrees
to Changes in Passport, INFORMATION WEEK, Jan. 30, 2003, available at http://
www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtmil?articlelD=6512119.
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For the purposes of this Article, the obvious starting point seems to be
the first meaning: code as technology in general, which is usually-if not
always-more privacy-threatening than privacy-friendly by its nature."'
But since privacy is all about balance, the other meaning of built-in rules is
useful: privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) can be a solution to re-
establishing disturbed balances. In the analysis of various domains in
which the privacy balance may be shifting, we shall start with a general
notion of privacy-influencing technology and then indicate whether and
how privacy-protecting norms could be built into technology as a possible
part of addressing potential shifts in protection.
A. Law Enforcement
As of old, law enforcement is one of the prime contenders in privacy
debates. By nature, law enforcement should uncover what is hidden and
what people would like to keep hidden. The natural tendency to safeguard
the interest of law enforcement, therefore, is to create investigation powers
that uncover hidden things-if necessary, by force. Constitutional protec-
tion against (over)intrusive searches and other kinds of prying into
people's lives is one of the most important areas in which privacy is
clearly at work. And although people may easily say they "have nothing to
hide," thus suggesting that the police should be given ample room for
crime investigation, most still would protest if the police installed a cam-
era in their bedroom to prevent marital murders. Privacy in the context of
protection from government intrusion into its citizens' private sphere re-
mains very much an issue. The context of law enforcement is also one of
the prime areas in which "code" affects privacy. Two major developments
in technology, surveillance and digitalization, have swayed the traditional
balance of law enforcement and privacy over the past decades.
The first is the advent of new surveillance technologies. Technologies
like transaction monitoring and location monitoring through tiny beacons
or mobile telephony, directional microphones, hacking, and merging pub-
lic and forensic databases are already sufficiently developed to be used to
great advantage for law enforcement. In the near future, advanced video
surveillance with face recognition, aerial photography, automated speech
recognition and voice recognition, and spyware may add to law-
enforcement's intrusion potential. Further ahead looms the use of tech-
nologies like Radio Frequency Identification (RFID),' 24 ambient
123. See infra Part VI.
124. ANN CAVOUKIAN, ONTARIO INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER, TAG, You'RE
IT: PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID) TECHNOLOGY (2004),
http://www.ipc.on.ca/docs/rfid.pdf.
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intelligence,' 25 and "smart dust' ' 26 that may enable systematic, covert, and
perfect tracking and observation of people in the most detailed aspects of
their personal lives. Most of these technologies enable not only reactive
searching but also proactive monitoring to detect criminals on the verge of
committing a crime.
The second development is equally important but less obvious. More
and more areas of people's lives are being digitized, and online methods
replace offline methods of doing things in communication, banking, shop-
ping, education, photography, archiving, and a myriad of other things.
This means that an ever-increasing amount of data about one's personal
life is digitized and stored somewhere. In turn, this enables law enforce-
ment to gather much more data with online powers than was available to
them with matching offline powers. To illustrate how these developments
work in practice, we will sketch two examples that show various ways in
which "code" functions in the law-enforcement context.
1. Case 1: Interceptability of Telecommunications
The interception of telecommunications has always been an important
tool for law enforcement. With the growth of telecommunications, this
importance has only increased-interception is now one of the most vital
tools for investigating and prosecuting crime.
With the telecommunications developments that took place in the
1990s, however, it increasingly seemed that the police could no longer rely
on the plain, old telephone system for its interception. New technologies,
infrastructures, and services-such as mobile telephony, packet-switched
communications, and call-forwarding-were not as easy to intercept tech-
nically. Therefore, governments decided to establish regulations that
demanded the telecommunications industry build a wiretapping capability
into their technology, thus guaranteeing it was at least technically feasible
for law enforcement to continue to intercept, regardless of further techno-
logical developments.
125. Ambient intelligence is "a pervasive and unobtrusive intelligence in the surrounding
environment supporting the activities and interactions of the users." Giuseppe Riva et al., Presence
2010: The Emergence of Ambient Intelligence, in BEING THERE: AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE 61 (G.
Riva, Fabrizio Davide & Wijnand A. Usselsteijn eds., 2003), available at http:l
www.vepsy.com/communication/book4/4_- 04riva.pdf; see Ambient Intelligence Research Group,
http://www.ambientintelligence.net/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
126. "Smart dust" is a sensor system implemented via objects of 1 cubic millimeter.
See, e.g., Matthew Last, Optical Communications Project Overview, http://www-
bsac.eecs.berkeley.edu/-mattlast/research/index.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005); Kris Pister et al.,
Smart Dust: Autonomous Sensing and Communication in a Cubic Millimeter, http://
robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/-pister/SmartDust/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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In the United States, the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act of 1994 (CALEA) was passed in October of 1994.127 The
purpose of CALEA is "to preserve the ability of law enforcement to con-
duct electronic surveillance in the face of rapid advances in
telecommunications technology.', 2 It requires telecommunications carri-
ers to ensure that their equipment, facilities, and services are capable of,
among other things, enabling the government to intercept communications
content and to access call-identifying information. 29 Moreover, the law
also demands a certain number of simultaneously interceptable lines' 3 -a
provision that led to fierce debates when the Federal Communications
Commission made proposals to implement it."' The law provides a "safe
harbor" for telecommunications carriers if they comply with publicly
available technical requirements or adopted standards of an industry asso-
ciation or standard-setting organization.'32 In turn, manufacturers of
telecommunications equipment and providers of support services are re-
quired to supply telecommunications carriers with equipment and services
that comply with the interceptability requirements.'33
Pursuant to CALEA, the telecommunications industry has developed
and is still developing technical standards for interceptability. For instance,
a subcommittee of the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA),
together with a committee of the Alliance for Telecommunications Indus-
try Solutions, has developed an interim standard, J-STD-025, that should
meet the CALEA requirements. Since the FCC found the standard defi-
cient in some respects, it added more requirements, for example, to
identify the active parties of a multiparty call, and to provide all signals,
such as the use of feature keys, available from the subject."
127. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 47 U.S.C.), available at http://www.askcalea.net/calea.html.
128. AskCALEA, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.askcalea.net/faqs.html#04 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
129. See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000).
130. See 47 U.S.C. § 1003 (2000).
131. See U.S. Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Although the
Commission appears to have interpreted the J-standard as expanding the authority of law enforce-
ment agencies to obtain the contents of communications, ... the Commission was simply
mistaken."); Further Notice & Proposed Rule, 13 EC.C.R. 22632 (1998); Public Notice, 13
F.C.C.R. 13786 (1998).
132. See 47 U.S.C. § 1006 (2000); AskCALEA, Standards, http://www.askcalea.net/
standards.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). Although "publicly available' the standards are not
cheap: for instance, it costs $352 to download standard J-STD-025-B-2003. Alliance for Tele-
communication Industry Solutions, Doc. No. J-STD-025-B-2003, https://www.atis.org/
atis/docstore/doc-display.asp?ID=-2570 (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
133. See 47 U.S.C. § 1005(b) (2000).
134. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 14 FC.C.R. 16794, 16825-
33, 16842-46 (1999); U.S. Telcom. Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 465.
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Telecommunications manufacturers have also been active: the "FBI
has signed agreements with AG Communications Systems, Lucent Tech-
nologies, Motorola, Nortel Networks, and Siemens AG for technical
solutions developed to meet the assistance capability requirements of
CALEA.'
,135
The United States has not been the only country to pass legislation on
interceptability. Indeed, the European Union quickly followed the U.S.
with the Council Resolution of January 17, 1995,36 which outlined quite
similar requirements for interceptability. Arguing that "interception may
only be effected insofar as the necessary technical provisions have been
made," the resolution listed a summary of the law-enforcement needs "for
the technical implementation of legally authorized interception in modem
telecommunications systems."'37 Subsequently, the member states carried
out the resolution by passing laws similar to CALEA.
The relationship with industry and standard-setting bodies was less di-
rect-or more covert-in Europe than in the U.S. An EU body did send a
letter to international standardization organizations (IEC, ISO, and ITU)'38
in December 1995, pointing out the resolution and "inviting" the organiza-
tions to take account of the requirements, 3 9 but neither the EU resolution
nor the national implementation laws explicitly refer to standard-setting
bodies or require telecommunications manufacturers to develop intercept-
able equipment. Apparently, the task was left more to industry itself-both
telecommunication providers and manufacturers-to develop and to in-
corporate interceptable equipment and services.
Although several industry and standardization bodies, such as the U.S.
TIA 40 and ATI' 41 and the European ETSI,' have been working on incor-
porating interception norms in the technology, other bodies have
consciously refrained from doing so. It is instructive to read the state-
135. AskCALEA, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.askcalea.net/faqs.html#12 (last
visited Nov. 15,2005).
136. Council Resolution of 17 January 1995, 1996 JO. (C 329) 1 (Resolution on the Lawful
Interception of Telecommunications).
137. Id.
138. See International Engineering Consortium, http://www.iec.org (last visited Nov. 15,
2005); International Organization for Standardization, Homepage, http://www.iso.org (last visited
Nov. 15, 2005); International Telecommunication Union, http://www.itu.int/home (last visited
Nov. 15, 2005).
139. See European Union and FBI Launch Global Surveillance System, STATEWATCH
BULL., Jan.-Feb. 1997, available at http://www.statewatch.orgleufbi/eufbiOl.htm.
140. See Telecommunications Industry Association Online, http://www.tiaonline.org (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
141. See Advanced Technology Institute, Advancing Technology Through Collaboration,
http://www.aticorp.org/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
142. See European Telecommunications Standards Institute, http://www.etsi.org (last
visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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ment of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) on their wiretap pol-
icy, which explains why the IETF decided not to consider interception
requirements as part of their standard-developing work.143 Apart from
considering that building-in interception capability will make the net-
work considerably more complex and, hence, more vulnerable, it also
argues that IETF standards relate to cross-border communications that
pass numerous jurisdictions with numerous, and diverging, requirements
for privacy. Building in a uniform privacy-infringing option would there-
fore not be a good thing; rather, national bodies should develop the
standards according to their own jurisdiction regime. This is a rather odd
argument for a body like the IETF, since the Internet, by nature, can
hardly cope with diverging national technical standards. Perhaps the real
reason why the IETF did not want to develop interceptability is their fear
of abuse:
Experience shows that tools designed for one purpose that are
effective for another tend to be used for that other purpose too,
no matter what its designers intended....
What this boils down to is that if effective tools for wiretapping
exist, it is likely that they will be used as designed, for purposes
legal in their jurisdiction, and also in ways they were not in-
tended for, in ways that are not legal in that jurisdiction. When
weighing the development or deployment of such tools, this
should be borne in mind.' 44
In other words, the IETF has refrained from building-in a specific option
for interceptability, partly because such "code" may not meet the privacy
laws of certain countries and also because the technology can be abused
to infringe privacy in ways its designers did not intend.
The case of interceptability of telecommunications shows that gov-
ernments have passed legislation that requires technology providers to
build in certain features related to legal norms: in this case, the feasibil-
ity of the investigative power of interception. Industry has, naturally,
complied with these legal requirements, and hence, telecommunications
infrastructures have a built-in capacity for interception, including more
detailed interception features according to the government requirements.
This is not to say that telecommunications technology is inherently pri-
vacy-infringing, but it is, thus, at least, capable of being privacy-
infringing.
143. IETF POLICY ON WIRETAPPING, THE INTERNET GROUP (2000), http://
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2804.txt (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (endorsed by the Internet Architec-
ture Board and Internet Engineering Steering Group).
144. Id. at 4-5.
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Perhaps because of the IETF's concern with resulting vulnerabili-
ties and privacy risks, the privacy-threatening "code" has not been
incorporated in the lower levels of the Internet architecture-
telecommunications providers use software and hardware add-ons to
ensure interceptability. This allows for national differentiation. At the
same time, however, this has also created less transparency, since-as
opposed to Internet standards-interceptability technologies and their
use are kept rather obscure. The U.S. debates over the Carnivore system,
which allows interception of packet-switched communications, illustrate




2. Case 2: Cryptography
"Cryptography" indicates systems that alter data so that unauthorized
people cannot understand the data. It is, essentially, a privacy-enhancing
technology, since it can protect the secrecy of communications and of
stored data. In the 1970s, cryptography saw two developments that were to
be of great significance to the development of the information age. First,
the U.S. developed the Data Encryption Standard (DES), an automated
cryptography system. This was based on traditional cryptographic meth-
ods, but DES was so well designed that it proved to be uncrackable even
by supercomputers until the mid-1990s. After DES, several similar sys-
tems were devised that proved to be equally strong, or stronger still
through the use of longer keys.
Second, and even more important, public-key cryptography was in-
vented: a system in which people no longer share a single key to encode
and decode a message; instead, each person has a key pair with a public
and a private key. Through public-key cryptography, people can commu-
nicate without having to exchange a key through a secure channel. You
can send someone your public key in an e-mail message, with which she
can send you a message that only you can read, and even if someone
eavesdropped and knows the encoding key, he is none the wiser because
he does not know the decoding key.
1 6
Until the 1970s, most cryptography systems could be cracked. But
the new generation of cryptography systems that emerged in the 1970s
has turned out to be virtually uncrackable, no matter the effort taken.
(This is in theory, at least; in practice, implementations and use of secure
145. See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Carnivore Page, http://
www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (listing EPIC's Freedom of In-
formation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), activities concerning the FBI's Carnivore project).
146. For a more technical review of these cryptography developments, see Gary C.
Kessler, An Overview of Cryptography, § 5.3-.4, May 1998, http://www.garykessler.net/
library/crypto.html.
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cryptography systems often turn out to have flaws.) It is a matter of
computing power: to crack a message, one must try every possible key,
and it takes literally ages before the right one is found. Naturally com-
puters get stronger every day, but it is easy to encode with a slightly
longer key to more than compensate for this. Compared with traditional
codes, then, modern automated codes are more or less uncrackable. It is
a difference of degree, not a fundamental difference, but the difference
of degree is so big that it has indeed altered the field.
The difference between the old and new cryptographic "code" has
created a controversy that only recently seems to have calmed down into
a status quo. Governments traditionally have not worried much that peo-
ple could use cryptography: only the government knew the most
sophisticated coding schemes, and what people encoded, the government
could usually decode. With modern cryptography, that is no longer the
case. People can use robust cryptography and the police-in theory-
stand empty-handed: wiretaps and computer searches are useless if all
they find is garbled code.
The controversy this has created is twofold, relating to two different
roles of government: protecting national security4 ' and enforcing the
law.'4 8  The latter part of the controversy, related to domestic
cryptography use, is more complex than the first, which primarily deals
with export controls. It was only in the early 1990s that governments
realized cryptography could seriously hamper law enforcement.
49
Conceptually, there are two possible solutions to address this: either
create mechanisms that ensure government access to decoding keys
147. See infra Part III.B.
148. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Crypto Law Survey (v. 23.0), Jan. 2006, http://
rechten.uvt.nl/koops/cryptolaw/, for an overview of states' initiatives in cryptography legisla-
tion. The examples that follow can be found, with references, on Koops's website.
149. It must be remarked here that this still appears to be mainly a theoretical problem.
There still is not really a law-enforcement problem with cryptography, even though it has been
predicted ever since 1993 that law enforcement would soon become a joke because of cryp-
tography. So far, cryptography appears to have blocked few criminal cases. Little public data
is available. The 2002 Wiretap Report for the Office the United States Courts mentions that
"[e]ncryption was reported to have been encountered in 16 wiretaps terminated in 2002 ... ;
however, in none of these cases was encryption reported to have prevented law enforcement
officials from obtaining the plain text of communications intercepted." 2002 WIRETAP RE-
PORT, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS 5, http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap02/2002wttxt.pdf.
See Dorothy Denning & William Baugh, Hiding Crimes in Cyberspace, 2 INFO. COMM. &
Soc'y 251 (1999), available at http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/-denning/crypto/hidingl.doc
(researching numerous cryptography cases related to searches, the majority of which encryp-
tion did not stop).
Our impression is that only in last few years, at least in the Netherlands, have police
really encountered encryption that could not be cracked easily in any significant number of
cases. Perhaps, in the future, criminal cryptography may indeed, therefore, become a real-life
problem.
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beforehand-for example, by having people deposit keys somewhere
when they want to use cryptography-or mechanisms that ensure access
to keys afterwards-by providing legal power that enables the police to
force someone to give them a decryption key in case of a crime.
The U.S. government was one of the first to try the first, ex ante ap-
proach. In 1993, they launched the Clipper chip, a chip for telephone
encryption with a built-in backdoor for government access.5 They
hoped that if enough people would voluntarily use this chip, the cryptog-
raphy problem would remain manageable. The police would simply
notice when someone used non-Clipper encryption, and this would be
interesting information in itself.
The U.S. was not the only country to try to curb cryptography's pro-
gress. In the Netherlands in 1994, a draft law was considered that
virtually would have banned cryptography use, except for those who
would be lucky enough to get a license; after large public outcry, the idea
was hastily abandoned. Still, the Dutch government for a long time af-
terwards deliberated schemes that resembled the Clipper chip. If Trusted
Third Parties (TTPs) offer confidentiality services (for example, to pro-
vide customers with cryptography keys for encoding data), they might be
forced to facilitate "legal access." In a "partnership approach" of gov-
ernment and industry, a project on Legal Access (Rechtmatige toegang)
was established to make sure the government could have access to cryp-
tography keys without obstructing industry too much. The outcome of
the project, however, was that an economic-effect analysis showed that
mandatory "legal access" is not economically feasible, since TTPs would
move abroad in that case; hence, the government refrained from further
steps in this direction.
Similar developments took place in the U.K., where the government
launched one consultation document after another with proposals for
government backdoor access to encoded data. At first, such systems pro-
posed to be mandatory, but later, the government said they could be
voluntary.'5 ' In Germany, part of the government also favored mandatory
150. Many documents concerning Clipper and its aftermath can be found in BUILDING
IN BIG BROTHER: THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICY DEBATE (Lance J. Hoffman ed., 1995), and
BRUCE SCHNEIER & DAVID BANISAR, THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS (1997).
151. Compare DTI, LICENSING OF TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES FOR THE PROVISION OF EN-
CRYPTION SERVICES: PUBLIC CONSULTATION PAPER ON DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR
LEGISLATION 57 (1997), http://www.fipr.org/polarch/ttp.html ("The legislation will provide
that bodies wishing to offer or provide encryption services to the public in the U.K. will be
required to obtain a licence.") with DTI, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT 33 (1999), http://www.dti.gov.uk/cii/elec/elec-coml.html
("[T]he Government has opted for a voluntary but statutory regime.").
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backdoor-access schemes, but other government bodies opposed this.'
52
France, which was the only country in the Western world that had had
strong domestic controls on cryptography at all, actually enacted a law in
1996 to regulate backdoor access: if people deposited their cryptography
keys with a government agency, they could get a license for strong cryp-
tography.'5'
Interestingly enough, governments were not the only ones to think
about and devise backdoor schemes. Cryptographers themselves were
active in the field, researching ways to build into the technology back-
door government access or, alternatively, ways to circumvent backdoor
access in schemes others devised. For example, a study group from
Royal Holloway University in London, developed a key-escrow scheme
for international communications that would allow national government
authorities to decrypt without having to resort to mutual assistance by
the foreign country. They also included options for sophisticating their
scheme: splitting keys to distribute among several TIPs and changing
keys regularly, so that, for example, time limits on wiretap warrants
might be enforced technically.'54
The extent to which cryptographers attempted to incorporate norms
into technology is illustrated in Bellare and Rivest's article.'55 They con-
sidered it a problem that there is no middle way between wiretapping
(which overhears all conversations) and not wiretapping (which over-
hears none). To provide such a middle way, Bellare and Rivest proposed
"translucent cryptography."'5 16 This is not opaque, whereby encrypted
communications are entirely unreadable for law enforcement, nor is it
transparent, which means that law enforcement cannot read everything
they intercept either. Rather, the system allows law enforcement to read a
fraction p of encrypted intercepts-where p is a number between 0 and
1. The amount of translucency, in their proposal, is to be established by
parliament. This fraction p could vary with applications; for instance,
whereas for domestic communications parliament might set p equal to
0.2 (allowing a relatively high level of privacy), they might require p to
152. See a summary in Koops, supra note 148 (select the "Germany" link), and links at
Christopher Kuner, Cryptography Regulation, http://www.kuner.com/data/crypto/crypto.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
153. Law No. 96-659 of July 26, 1996, Journal Officiel de ]a Rdpublique Frangaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 27, 1996, p. 11384.
154. Nigel Jefferies, Chris Mitchell & Michael Walker, A Proposed Architecture for
Trusted Third Party Services, in CRYPTOGRAPHY: POLICY AND ALGORITHMS, 1029 LECTURE
NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 98, 99-100 (Ed Dawson & Jovan Golid eds., 1996).
155. Mihir Bellare & Ronald L. Rivest, Translucent Cryptography: An Alternative to Key
Escrow, and Its Implementation via Fractional Oblivious Transfer, 12 J. CRYPTOLOGY 117
(1999), available at http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/-rivest/BellareRivest-translucent.ps.
156. See id. at 118-20.
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be 1 for international communications, or, at least, for communications
with rogue states. Parliament could decide to change the fraction if the
situation changes significantly, because either some terrible crimes in-
volving cryptography have occurred or elections were held recently and
parties promised their voters to set p to a particular value. This, at least,
is the world view emerging from the technical paper.'5 7 The point of this
example is not that it is a realistic proposal, but that it shows the extent
to which some code developers go to devise code that can incorporate
norms-in this case, norms to be set by parliament.
Nevertheless, however much governments and cryptographers may
have thought they could solve the problem of criminal cryptography use
with this approach, it all came to nothing. By the late 1990s, backdoor-
access schemes were out: Clipper had died a silent death;'58 the Dutch,
U.K., and German governments thought better of it; and France aban-
doned the 1996 law and liberalized cryptography use in 1999."9 There
were several reasons for the failure of this backdoor approach. U.S. citi-
zens did not trust the government with backdoor access, and even the
U.S. government itself failed to use the Clipper chip. Technically, the
backdoor schemes were tricky, not having proved themselves secure
enough to be considered reliable. Most importantly, the schemes would
not serve their purpose of preventing criminals from using encryption:
serious and organized criminals would always have easy access to non-
backdoor cryptography, and if necessary, they could use superencryption
(first encrypt with a private, uncrackable system, then encrypt with the
government backdoor system) to escape notice. Even if non-backdoor
cryptography were outlawed, few criminals would mind: they would just
break another law (and one that was hardly enforceable anyway). With
corporate and non-habitual criminals, the backdoor schemes might have
had some effect, but for the kinds of criminals that the governments
really wanted to target, the backdoor schemes were ineffective.
Then what? In recent years, many governments have chosen the sec-
ond, ex post approach. They have enacted laws that allow police to
command people to decrypt or to hand over their cryptography keys. The
Netherlands was the first to do so, in 1993.' 60 More recently, the U.K.,
157. See id. at 129.
158. Colleen O'Hara & Heather Harreld, DOD Sinks the Clipper, FED. COMP. WEEK,
Feb. 17, 1997.
159. See Decree No. 99-200 of Mar. 17, 1999, J.O., Mar. 19, 1999, p. 4951 (Fr); Decree
No. 99-199 of Mar. 17, 1999, J.O., Mar. 19, 1999, p. 4050 (Fr).
160. See Wetboek van Strafvordering [Sv] [Code of Criminal Procedure], art. 125k, 2
(2003) (Neth.), codified by Wet computercriminaliteit [the Computer Crime Act], Staatsblad
van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] [Official Gazette of of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands], 1993, p. 33.
'Code'and the Slow Erosion of Privacy
Belgium, France, and a host of other countries have followed.,6' Thus,
instead of relying on "code" to incorporate law-enforcement access, they
have settled for a merely legal solution in the form of an investigative
power: if the police encounter encoded data, they can command decryp-
tion.
The upshot is that cryptography remains a privacy-enhancing tech-
nology, which citizens can use to protect themselves against
governments. It does not appear to be in very wide use, however: it is
built-in in numerous software and infrastructure elements, but end-users
rarely use encryption themselves. The lack of use may be explained
partly by the perceived difficulty of the technology but also partly by the
government campaigns of the 1990s against cryptography, not least the
export controls that effectively hampered law-abiding citizens and busi-
nesses from adopting strong cryptography on a large scale.' 62 Regulation
in this case seems to have had an impact, not-as in the case of inter-
ceptability--on technology itself but on the use of a privacy-enhancing
"code."
3. Balance
Technology appears to be a key driver in enabling law enforcement
to pry deeper into the personal sphere, often invisibly and from a safe
distance. The balance of privacy with new investigation powers is sup-
posedly made time and again by the legislature and the courts, but
because technology is developing, so is the reasonable expectation of
privacy surrounding technology. After all, there is less expectation of
privacy when surfing the Internet than when watching television at home
or when walking streets that have clearly visible 24-hour camera surveil-
lance. Likewise, the case of location data 63 suggests that perhaps
somewhere in the not too far-away future, people's movements may also
lose the reasonable expectation of privacy since localization is becoming
an increasingly common side-effect of technology.' 64
161. See Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, 23, §§ 49-55 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000023.htm; Law No. 2001-298 of Nov. 28, 2000,
Moniteur Belge/Staatsblad [M.B.] [Belgian Monitor], Feb. 3, 2001, p. 2909, 2912 (amending
Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 88); Law No. 2001-1062 of Nov. 15, 2001, O.J.,
Oct. 16, 2001, p. 18215 (amending French Code of Criminal Procedure, tit. IV), available at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=INTXOI00032L. Also, see the
entries on Australia, Ireland, Trinidad & Tobago, India, Malaysia, and Singapore in Koops,
supra note 148; the latter three examples have limited scope only.
162. See infra Part II.B.2.
163. See infra Part III.B.I.
164. Michael Levi & David S. Wall, Technologies, Security, and Privacy in the Post-9/1l
European Information Society, 31 J. L. & Soc'Y 194, 211 (2004) ("[A] by-product of ...
technologies is the traffic data flow that is generated through usage, which records the indi-
vidual's movements, actions, and behavior.").
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One, therefore, may argue that "code" is changing the traditional
balance of privacy and law enforcement in many domains. In the physi-
cal sphere, privacy is threatened as the home becomes intelligent and
connected to the Internet through domotics and as electronic monitoring
allows the police to see through walls and curtains. Relational privacy is
put under pressure as personal relationships depend vitally on telecom-
munications that may be wiretapped but that also may be sweepingly
monitored with speech and voice recognition and are increasingly sub-
jected to data retention. Informational privacy disappears when the
police can request all electronically processed data on any subject from
any data processor and can merge databases to find hidden patterns and
connections.
However, it should be observed that this development is not caused
so much by "code"-that is, technology with explicit privacy-infringing
features built-in-as by technology in general. Privacy infringement
happens to be a side-effect of technology development per se. The case
of interceptability is an exception in this respect; it seems the only ex-
ample in the list of developments sketched above that has consciously
built-in "privacy infringement." Still, conscious or not, the effect on pri-
vacy is practically the same: slow erosion.
Does "code" do something about this shifting balance itself? Are
privacy-enhancing technologies somehow counterbalancing the privacy-
threatening technologies in this field? To some extent, that may be the
case. Cryptography is a prime example of a technology that enables peo-
ple to keep communications and written thoughts hidden from
government surveillance. Steganography also may hide the fact of com-
munication itself: post a picture of a red Toyota to a newsgroup with a
message hidden in it that only your partner in crime will recognize.
Anonymizers enable Internet activities with less of a chance of being
traced. Sunglasses will help to thwart face recognition, and a Faraday
cage will make your home impenetrable to electronic spies. Many exam-
ples like these can be given of technologies that help to counteract
invasive technologies.
Nevertheless, the impression is that the privacy-threatening code is
more developed and more widely used than the privacy-enhancing code.
One of the reasons for this is that citizens themselves are responsible to
use protective technologies, and they usually have no reason-and often
no knowledge or awareness-to bear considerable costs and effort to
build a technological shield against government intrusion. Law enforce-
ment, on the other hand, has a major incentive to use the intrusive
technologies; this may explain why privacy-threatening technologies are
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developed sooner and used more widely than privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies.
Of the examples given, only cryptography seems a PET that has
gained a definite foothold, if not with the general public, then at least
with technology-aware citizens and criminals. But as the case of cryp-
tography shows, governments have not been happy with privacy
technologies, precisely for the reason that they hamper law enforcement.
And although cryptography-curbing proposals and laws seem to have
died a slow death, as soon as a high-profile child murder or terrorist case
emerges in which cryptography blocks finding the culprit, legislatures
may be quick to yield to the pressure of law enforcement and pass a law
that intends to restrict the use of cryptography.' 5 This is not to say that
legislatures will not consider the balance between privacy and law en-
forcement in such a case, but it suggests that the interest of law
enforcement is often considered so important that privacy-friendly tech-
nologies will not be readily supported by governments, even if they do
not outlaw them in a single sweep of legislative zeal. The bottom line
seems to be that law enforcement always trumps privacy.
B. National Security
The interest of national security is closely related to that of law en-
forcement; we, therefore, do not go into great detail here. Nevertheless,
there is one significant difference worth mentioning. Protecting national
security is, by its nature, closely intertwined with secrecy and stealth.
Security agencies investigations thrive on covert intrusion techniques.
This makes privacy-threatening "code" all the more relevant to the field
of national security: it is precisely covert surveillance that has received a
boost through the technology development over the past decades. Global
eavesdropping on an unprecedented scale through Echelon, satellite pho-
tography that, in military applications, will soon become sophisticated
enough to notice intimate details of individuals on earth (for example,
sunbathers on a deserted stretch of beach), thermal imagers, and "smart
dust" '66 are but a few examples of the increased potential for covert intel-
ligence. We describe two areas that illustrate the various ways in which
this increase occurs.
165. Cf Alison A. Bradley, Extremism in the Defense of Liberty? The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the USA PATRIOT Act, 77 TUL. L. REv. 465
(2002).
166. See Riva, supra note 125, and accompanying text.
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1. Case 1: Location Data
One example of the ever increasing potential for information gather-
ing is the booming area of location data. This is not specific to national
security-we might equally well have treated it under the heading of law
enforcement or commerce-but it is certainly an area where security
agencies will benefit in ways not yet fully grasped.
Technically, localization is closely related to two technologies.'67 The
first is mobile telephony, where network-based systems can locate a mo-
bile phone, or cell phone. The network "knows" in which cell a phone is
located, but not precisely where in the cell. However, as the granularity
of the cells vary in size from a few hundred meters in city centers to tens
of kilometers in sparsely populated areas, the precision with which the
phone's location can be determined also ranges accordingly. This means
that the precision can be fairly precise, at best. But there are ways to en-
hance localization to a scale of several to tens of meters, for instance, by
triangulation using the speed and angle with which a mobile phone en-
ters or leaves a cell and comparing signals received by various cells at
the same time. Such refinements are being developed and installed in
order to provide location-based service. '
The second technology is the Global Positioning System (GPS).
This is a system of U.S.-owned satellites, initially launched and still in
use for defense purposes, but increasingly also used in civil applications,
that enable a handheld device to determine its location through the time
and its position relative to three or more satellites. GPS enables localiza-
tion with a precision of around ten meters; presumably, defense devices
may reach a higher precision of around one meter. Contrary to the net-
work-based location systems, the satellite network does not "know"
where the device is, since it is the device itself that computes its location.
Nevertheless, if combined with a mobile phone, wireless radio transmit-
ter (in a GPS "transceiver"), or a disk and program that stores
coordinates every minute (a GPS recorder), GPS can also give informa-
tion about the location to third parties.' 69
167. See Linda Ackerman, James Kempf & Toshio Miki, Wireless Location Privacy:
Law and Policy in the U.S., EU and Japan, THE INTERNET SOCIETY (ISOC) MEMBER BRIEF-
ING #15 (2003), http://www.isoc.org/briefings/015/briefingl5.pdf (providing an illuminating
and brief description of the technologies).
168. This will be discussed further below.
169. Apart from these major technologies associated with mobile communications, it
should be noted that other technologies may also increasingly provide location information.
An example is RFID tags, see infra Part III.D.2, which might for instance lead to information
about a person-or that person's clothes, shoes, or bag---entering or leaving a shop being
stored in a database.
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As David Phillips has shown, there are at least three major drivers
behind emerging "wireless telecommunication systems" that "incorpo-
rate surveillance capacity, particularly the capacity to track and record
individuals' locations."'7 The first-and for the U.S., perhaps the most
important-is emergency response systems that can now benefit from
location data from a caller's mobile phone to immediately track where
the phone call-and presumably the emergency-originates and,
through a combination of digital maps and routes, the fastest way to get
there. The FCC has, through the Wireless Communications and Public
Safety Act of 1999, T7 established "Emergency 911,'" requiring wireless
operators to guarantee a high degree of localization. It is up to the opera-
tors whether they want to ensure this through network-based localization
or GPS.
173
The second driver behind location technologies is the business inter-
est in location-based services (LBS). These are services based on fairly
precise location data, within a range of several to tens of meters. Know-
ing the exact location of potential customers is immensely attractive for
enterprises: it opens up opportunities for on-the-spot advertising ("Com-
ing up on your right is a Wendy's-veggie burger for only $ .99!") and
information services (call a national weather line and receive the local
forecast). It also enables companies to track and to control employees
("Why did you stay at the local pub for forty minutes?") or simply to
enhance efficiency (for example, taxi and shipping companies). A par-
ticularly interested sector is the automobile industry: car-navigation
systems are booming, literally telling drivers how to get wherever they
want to go; road-toll systems might efficiently compute tolls without
cars having to slowly pass toll stations; rental-car companies can check
speeding or driving on forbidden mud tracks; and car owners feel safer if
the car is locatable in case of a carjacking. In fact, a major application
seems to be parents' providing their children with location-indicating
technology in order to safeguard against kidnapping.
7 4
Finally, the third location-technology driver is surveillance. Law-
enforcement and national-security agencies are interested in location
170. J. David Phillips, Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in Wireless
Communication, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (2003).
171. 47 U.S.C. § 615 (2000).
172. 911 Service, 47 C.FR. § 20.18 (2005).
173. See Phillips, Beyond Privacy, supra note 170, at 3-5. For more extensive analysis,
see J. David Phillips, Texas 9-1-1: Emergency Telecommunications and the Genesis of Surveil-
lance Infrastructure, 30 TELECOMM. POL'Y (forthcoming 2006).
174. "[T]he main reason that these devices have suddenly gained popularity is their abil-
ity to track the location of children." Waseem Karim, The Privacy Implications of Personal
Locators, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 484, 486 (2004). This is also one of the RFID technology uses that
appear to gain increasing attention. See infra Part HI.D.2.
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information of mobile-phone calls. Telecommunication operators are
required to make available to these agencies the location of the cells in
which phone calls took place. "5 It is true that this has not driven the de-
velopment of technology as much as the first two drivers-government
surveillance has merely followed existing technological developments
here. Nevertheless, there is a certain driving force here, particularly if
mandatory data retention is enacted and made applicable to mobile loca-
tion data.'
6
Now why is this important for national security? Security and intel-
ligence agencies will benefit immensely from the host of detailed
location information that is slowly but inevitably becoming available
about persons. They already receive cell-site location data from mobile
telephones when they order operators to produce traffic data. More im-
portantly, once more applications and services are based on precise
network-based localization or on GPS transceivers, agencies may order
more data from those who process the location data, or, perhaps, they
may even intercept them wirelessly in some ways. Moreover, such data
may be combined with other data. For instance, retrieved location data
may lead to a CCTV tape that shows an image of the person phoning in
the supermarket or at the gas station. Also, it is not inconceivable that
obligatory location tracking for national-security purposes will be estab-
lished as well, just as localization in "Emergency 911" (E91 1) has been
mandated. 77
Perhaps more immediately relevant will be the active localization
that national-security agencies can use. GPS recorders or transceivers
can be attached to vehicles and boxes, and as they grow smaller, to suit-
cases or clothes. Law enforcement already has used a GPS recorder
successfully to track a murder suspect's truck movements to the grave
where he reburied his victims. 7 8 This differs from a traditional direction
transponder in that there is no need to follow the item itself, which al-
ways entails the risk of discovery; one can simply and inconspicuously
175. In the U.S., CALEA, 47 U.S.C. § 1006 (2000), has been interpreted as to cover "the
location of a cell site location at the beginning and termination of a call," Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 51,710, 51711 (Sept. 24, 1999). The same
holds for the Netherlands, where article 126n of the Code of Criminal Procedure-ordering
delivery of traffic data-includes the location of the cells in which someone used a mobile
phone. Wetboek van Strafrordering [Sv], art. 126n (2006).
176. See, e.g., Council of the European Union, Draft Framework Decision on the Reten-
tion of Data, at 9, COM (2004) 15098 (Apr. 28, 2004) (requiring location and traffic data),
available at http://register.consilium.eu.intpdf/en/04/stO8/stO8958.enO4.pdf.
177. See 911 Service, 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2005).
178. See State v. Jackson, 46 P.3d 257, 261 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); David A. Schumann,
Tracking Evidence with GPS Technology, Wisc. LAW., May 2004, at 9, 9 (further detailing the
Jackson circumstances).
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check the route followed afterwards by retrieving the device and reading
the recorded GPS data.
To sum up, this case shows that technology enables increasing, sys-
tematic, and covert localization of individuals. Security agencies join in
and profit from the market and E911 developments-just as law-
enforcement agencies and businesses will benefit from location tech-
nologies. It is not unlikely these government benefits may be reinforced
by legal requirements for government-surveillance purposes, demanding
storage and production of location data in a variety of cases. The associ-
ated privacy shift is significant, since localization is possible on a much
wider scale and also can be executed ipsofacto by retrieving stored loca-
tion information. This substantially impacts the reasonable expectation
of privacy that people have traditionally had in movement: they may
have been visible at a certain time at a certain place, but much less trace-
able for a longer period of time. The continuous localization current and
future technologies offer, thus, significantly contributes to the "disap-
pearance of disappearance" that is a defining characteristic of the
information age. '
2. Case 2: Cryptography revisited
In the case of cryptography discussed in the previous section, we
mentioned that cryptography perturbed national security, mainly because
if foreigners use it, eavesdropping becomes useless. This has given rise
to export controls in many countries. During the Cold War, agreements
were made within the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM) to curb the export of cryptography. In 1995, this was
followed up by the Wassenaar Arrangement,' 80 an international (non-
binding) instrument of 33 countries that regulates the export of weapons
and dual-use goods (that is, goods that have both a military and a civil
application); cryptography is such a dual-use good.'8 ' The thrust of the
arrangement is to allow export of only weak (easily crackable) cryptog-
raphy and to require licenses for export of strong cryptography. As the
1990s evolved, the controls were increasingly controversial, especially in
179. Levi, supra note 164, at 206 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Kevin D. Haggerty
& Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRITISH J. SOCIOLOGY 605, 619
(2001)).
180. Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies (July 12, 1996) as amended, available at http://www.wassenaar.org/
guildines/guidelines.doc; see generally, WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, SUN MICRO-
SYSTEMS LABORATORIES, THE EXPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY AND 21ST 2
(2000), http://research.sun.com/features/tenyears/volcd/papers/22Diffie.pdf.
181. See Wassenaar Arrangement, Dual-Use List, Category 5, Part 2, Information Secu-
rity, available at http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html ("Category 5-Part 2");
Export Admininstration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2005).
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the U.S. since they hampered electronic commerce, and were practically
unenforceable, given that strong cryptography programs could be
downloaded from many places on the Internet. After several relaxations
in the U.S.'8 2 and in the Wassenaar regulations, the controversy seems to
have calmed down in the new millennium; apparently, the licensing pro-
cedures are sufficiently smooth nowadays not to really obstruct
international (e-)commerce anymore. Of course, the effectiveness of re-
maining export controls is low: if foreign crooks and criminals want to
obtain strong cryptography, they can download reliable and free pro-
grams from various countries through the Internet.
But there is more. In the "law-enforcement" case description,' we
asserted that cryptography has retained its foothold as a privacy-
enhancing technology. But this is not entirely true. Even here, a suspi-
cion cannot be altogether discarded that backdoors are built in. It is true
that the idea of building in mandatory backdoors for government access
has utterly failed, but this regards the protocols and standards. We can be
fairly sure that cryptography systems, like the Advanced Encryption
Standard,' 84 are reliable and do only what they are supposed to do be-
cause the protocols have been published and scrutinized extensively.'
However, for implementations and concrete products, this may be differ-
ent. The story of Crypto AG is disillusioning:
For decades, the US has routinely intercepted and deciphered
top secret encrypted messages of 120 countries. These nations
had bought the world's most sophisticated and supposedly se-
cure commercial encryption technology from Crypto AG, a
Swiss company that staked its reputation and the security con-
cerns of its clients on its neutrality .... All the while, because of
a secret agreement between the National Security Agency (NSA)
and Crypto AG, they might as well have been hand delivering
the message to Washington. Their Crypto AG machines had been
rigged so that when customers used them, the random encryp-
tion key could be automatically and clandestinely transmitted
182. See 65 Fed. Reg. 2492-2502 (Jan. 14, 2000) (codified in scattered portions of 15
C.F.R. chap. 7).
183. See supra Part III.A.
184. See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST), ANNOUNCING
AES (2001), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fipsl97/fips-97.pdf.
185. See IAIK Krypto Group, AES Lounge, http://www.iaik.tu-graz.ac.at/research/
krypto/AES/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2005) (hosting a plethora of links to papers written con-
cerning the AES standard). The page is a funded through the European Union's Sixth
Framework Programme (FP6), the agency responsible for the European Research Area (ERA).
Id.; see also Council Decision 1513/2002/E, 2002 O.J. (L 232) 1, available at ftp:/I
ftp.cordis.lu/pub/documentsr5/natdirOOOOO29/s_1831005_20021107_150652_6FPLO21654e
n.pdf; What is FP6, http://www.cordis.lu/fp6/whatisfp6.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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with the enciphered message. NSA analysts could read the mes-
sage traffic as easily as they could the morning newspaper. '
This is not to suggest that every cryptography product is bugged, but the
story should make us wary of trusting privacy-enhancing products at first
sight.
3. Balance
The cases show that, even more than is the case with law enforce-
ment, "code" is threatening the existing balance between privacy and
national security interests. And since the activities and technologies of
security agencies are much less published than those of law enforce-
ment, there is even less incentive for people to protect themselves with
privacy-enhancing technologies. Thus, particularly in the area of national
security, "code" favors a significant shift of the balance to the detriment
of privacy, a push that only legislatures and courts can check in a con-
scious attempt to retain privacy at a certain level. Since 9/11, however,
such a conscious attempt is anathema, and national-security interests ride
along with technology to diminish citizens' reasonable expectations of
privacy.
In these domains, the principal value to be protected clearly seems to
be security at the cost of a whole range of other competing values: dig-
nity, self-evaluation, and protected communication being prominent
victims. Interestingly, cost, a value that ordinarily favors giving up one's
private sphere, is also affected. The measures taken to increase security
are costly and are likely only to increase in the future.
8 7
C. E-Government
We started this Article with a discussion of Bentham's Panopticon, the
ultimate way government could spy on and control its citizens. Whereas
this image may be an appropriate one in the light of developments with
respect to national security as described in the previous section, e-
government shows us a different face of government. Here it is not so
much Big Brother who monitors its citizens, but instead Soft Sister guards
186. Wayne Madsen, Crypto AG: The NSA's Trojan Whore?, 63 COVERT ACTION Q.,
Winter 1998, at 36, 36 (footnote omitted).
187. The aforementioned EU proposal on data retention, Draft Framework Decision on
the Retention of Data, supra note 176, has been highly criticized, partly on the basis of the
burden on citizens and service providers. See, e.g., INVASIVE, ILLUSORY, ILLEGAL, AND ILLE-
GITIMATE: PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN DIGITAL RIGHTS (EDRI) RESPONSE TO
THE CONSULTATION ON A FRAMEWORK DECISION ON DATA RETENTION (Gus Hosein ed.,
2004), http://www.privacyintemational.org/issues/terrorisni/rpt/responsetoretention.html.
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and looks after them,' although Soft Sister may turn out not to be so
soft after all, as we shall see.
Since the mid-1990s, governments have adopted the notion of elec-
tronic government (e-government), following the advances of e-
commerce. In the U.S. Vice-President Al Gore's Reengineering Through
Information Technology program, 9 the two hitherto deemed opposing
forces-efficiency and consumerism-were connected, and they have
since dominated the development of e-government. An important result
of the e-government venture seems to be that improving service delivery
for citizens and improving efficiency in the public sector prevail over
informational privacy protection."
In the rise of e-government, citizens are more and more seen as cus-
tomers who deserve levels of service delivery comparable to those in the
private sector.19' Service delivery should be simpler, more efficient, and
more customer-friendly. Information technologies, especially the Inter-
net, are a means to accomplish these goals. Central concepts in the e-
government development are online service delivery and integrated ser-
vice delivery through one-stop shops. The former allows citizens to
apply for services, such as permits or grants through the Internet. The
latter means that problems are addressed in a holistic manner: instead of
having to go from agency to agency, a citizen can apply for several re-
lated services at a single location, both offline and online.
The Internet and closed networks have a huge potential impact on
the privacy of citizens in the public sphere because they allow the fiction
we call "government" to become reality. Government in most countries
is composed of a multitude of agencies of varying size, each of them
responsible for a particular set of tasks with corresponding responsibili-
ties. And each keeps their own records to carry out their daily
• 192
operations. The Social Welfare agency, for instance, has to have re-
188. Paul Frissen, Public Administration in Cyberspace, in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN
AN INFORMATION AGE: A HANDBOOK 33, 35 (I.Th.M. Snellen & W.B.H.J. van der Donk, eds.,
1998).
189. AL GORE, OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT, REENGINEERING THROUGH INFORMA-
TION TECHNOLOGY: ACCOMPANYING REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW
(1993), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/reports/it.html.
190. See Perri 6, Charles Raab & Christine Bellamy, Joined-Up Government and Pri-
vacy in the United Kingdom: Managing Tensions Between Data Protection and Social Policy,
Part 1, 83 PUB. ADMIN. 111 (2005).
191. See F. LESLIE SEIDLE, RETHINKING THE DELIVERY OF PUBLIC SERVICES TO CITI-
ZENS (1995).
192. A study commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior in the Netherlands showed
that there are some 30,000 of these registrations in the Netherlands, a considerable amount,
given that it has a population of 16 million people. H. BLEKER, W.J. LAMERIS & D.L.W.
ZIELHUIS, ELEKTRONISCHE BESTANDEN VAN HET BESTUUR [ELECTRONIC RECORDS OF THE
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cords to provide citizens on welfare their monthly benefit. They have to
keep track of who is entitled to what amount of benefit, what is paid and
when, and other data. It is safe to say that almost all records in public
offices are computer databases nowadays. And, as agencies increasingly
are wired-up, their databases can be combined-to offer both online ser-
vices and the holistic services e-government rhetoric heralded. The
wiring-up of previously separated databases also leads to data exchange
between agencies and to combining data into new information. Goals of
improving government efficiency and improving service delivery to citi-
zens introduce pressure to do just that: combine information sources
across agencies.
Both government and citizens benefit from this scheme at first, citi-
zens even in a double sense: efficiency gains may lead to lower taxes,
and better service delivery may lead to more satisfied customers. Effi-
ciency gains for government derive from the fact that information is
entered once and reused at multiple locations. The cost of obtaining data
decreases and the overall accuracy of the data can be higher than in the
case of each agency collecting its own data. To illustrate what the com-
bination of personal data in the context of e-government purports, two
cases are explored.
1. Case 1: Pro-Active Service Delivery
The benefits for the citizen derive from the fact that once the wired
government knows the identity of a citizen, the various databases can be
used to determine their legal position with respect to rights and obliga-
tions, at least to some extent. For instance, the entitlement to a rental
benefit can be established by combining income data (available to the
tax authorities) with data on rent the applicant paid (available to the
housing corporation, which in some cases is a public agency). Informa-
tion from the various government databases can therefore be used to pre-
populate (online) forms or even to make decisions on the basis of the
data already available, without a need for citizens to apply for these ser-
vices altogether. This latter type of service delivery is called pro-active
service delivery 93 and shows precisely what is meant by the aforemen-
tioned Soft-Sister concept: government taking active care of its citizens
by combining the available information on citizens, determining their
rights (and obligations), and taking action on these without waiting for
ADMINISTRATION], BDO CONSULTANTS 70 (1998), http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/
535 1/onderzoekelektronischebestandenvanhetbestuur.pdf.
193. See DUTCH MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND KINGDOM RELATIONS, CONTRACT
WITH THE FUTURE: A VISION ON THE ELECTRONIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
AND CITIZEN 27 (2000), available at http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/3925/contract_
with_future_5-00.pdf (English version).
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the citizens to call for these actions. 94 This paternalistic notion may ap-
peal to some and is part of government policy in some countries, such as
the Netherlands. In Contract with the Future,'95 a Dutch policy paper in
which pro-active service delivery is adopted as Dutch policy, the primary
reasons for doing so are mentioned: "Services are improved, there is an
increased take-up of previously unused services and legal equality in-
creases, as do effectiveness and efficiency."'1
96
The idea of combining databases in the sense described above made
national headlines in the Netherlands at the end of 1997, when the city of
Groningen announced that it was going to use combined databases to
locate citizens entitled to various 'services for people with insufficient
means. Various studies in the early 1990s had shown that considerable
numbers of people entitled to these benefits and subsidies failed to apply
for them.9 7 The initial experiments carried out in Groningen and a num-
ber of other cities' 98 have shown that combining data from different data
sources can indeed help to locate people entitled to certain benefits, al-
though the effectiveness varies. Local services gained more than
nationally available ones. This is not unsurprising as national services
are better known to the public than local services.'9 The experiences
with combining data sources in Groningen and elsewhere in the Nether-
lands have spurred the uptake of pro-active service delivery in the
Netherlands, and it was adopted as one of the pillars of Dutch e-
Government in 200 0 .
E-government has matured since 2000 and more advanced examples
of pro-active service delivery can be witnessed at various places. A re-
cent study commissioned by the European Commission discusses a
number of them in their report on best practices in back-office integra-
tion in Europe.20 ' Common themes where we see examples of pro-active
194. See Frissen, supra note 188.
195. CONTRACT WITH THE FUTURE, supra note 193.
196. Id. at 27.
197. For instance, Van Oorschot concluded that up to 26% of the people in the city of
Rotterdam entitled to Housing benefits do not apply for them. See WIM J.H. VAN OORSCHOT,
TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT: A STUDY OF NON-TAKE-UP OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 151 tbl.
5.2 (1994). These numbers are consistent with findings in numerous other studies. See, e.g.,
SOCIAAL CULTUREEL PLANBUREAU (SCP), ARMOEDEMONITOR 1997 [POVERTY MONITOR]
(1997), available at http://www.scp.nl/publicaties/boeken/9057491044/Armoedemonitor-
1997.pdf.
198. See DUTCH MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EMPLOYMENT, TERUGDRINGEN
NIET-GEBRUIK VAN INKOMENSAFHANKELIJKE VOORZIENINGEN; PILOTS BESTANDSVERGELI-
JKING [RETURNING USE OF INCOME-RELATED BENEFITS, PILOT REPORT] (1999).
199. See id.
200. See CONTRACT WITH THE FUTURE, supra note 193.
201. See JEREMY MILLARD ET AL., REORGANISATION OF GOVERNMENT BACK OFFICES
FOR BETTER ELECTRONIC PUBLIC SERVICES-EUROPEAN GOOD PRACTICES (BACK-OFFICE
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service delivery on the basis of data interoperability are child allowances
(for instance, in Ireland and Spain) and tax filing (in Finland and Spain).
Child allowance is triggered by birth notifications received by the civil
registration service. The process is partially automated in the case of a
first child. In this case the parents receive a partially filled out form. In
the case of subsequent children there is no need for form filing at all, and
payments start automatically after the responsible agency receives the
birth notification. °2
The report also noted:
In each of the countries (Finland, Ireland and Spain) from which
the above cases are taken, there have been few, if any, problems
with data privacy, either because of legal restrictions or objec-
tions by the citizen. Such conditions do not obtain in all
European countries, which makes the offer of pro-active services
much more problematic there.0 3
However, the examples described so far only concern a very limited
number of databases and agencies involved; child allowance is triggered
by a birth-notification form the civil registry, for instance. It is not diffi-
cult to imagine more and more agencies and registers becoming involved
in this type of service delivery, leading to an increasing amount of per-
sonal data becoming "connected." This will certainly affect privacy.
The Dutch city of Enschede provides an example of what is to come
with respect to linking databases concerning individual citizens in pro-
active service delivery in their project "my counter."2°' Once the citizen
has identified himself to the city online, the system provides personal-
ized advice and news. The user is, for instance, notified on the progress
of his applications, the expiry of passport and driver's license, but also
information on roadwork and town planning in the user's immediate
neighborhood can be provided. These types of personalized services are
customary in the commercial domain, where it is part of customer rela-
tionship management (CRM). The Enschede example shows the use of
multiple databases, residing at different municipal agencies. The poten-
tial privacy impact may surpass that in the private sector because it may
impact on rights and obligations of citizens.0 5
REORGANISATION), available at http://www.epsigate.org/sample-content/backoffice_
reorganisation final report.pdf (2004).
202. See id. at 99-104.
203. Id. at 42.
204. See, e.g., "Digitaal Kluisje" Voor Burgers Enschede ["My Digital Counter" for
Enschede Residents], BURGER@OVERHEID, July 14, 2004, http://www.burger.overheid.nl/
nieuws/?id=594.
205. See infra Part III.C.2.
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The effects of data exchange for the benefit of pro-active service de-
livery arise not only as a result of the actual combination of data
previously unassociated but also because it acts as a catalyst for even
more exchange. Access to information in databases can be provided on
the basis of many attributes associated to a person (such as their name or
address). In practice, however, identification numbers are frequently
used for this purpose. A reason for using identification numbers instead
of, for instance, one's name, is that they are concise and do not have
variants or duplicates. Names and addresses can be written in many dif-
ferent ways; this is not only the case with "foreign" names containing
diacritics, but also with ordinary names which give rise to different spell-
ings: omission of middle initials, additions to names, maiden names, or
other variations. The advantage of using identification numbers is even
bigger when data sources have to be combined. Here the process of
matching of records in the various tables on the basis of names or ad-
dresses produces many mismatches and non-matches due to variations.
As a consequence there is a tendency to use a single unique identifi-
cation number for a large variety of, if not all, government databases.
Recent developments illustrated this tendency in the Dutch medical sec-
tor. In 2002, the Dutch Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming
Persoonsgegevens in Dutch) issued a policy paper arguing for the use of
sectoral unique identification numbers instead of a single identification
number for all government databases.20 This scheme allows for inher-
ently better data protection than the use of a single identification number,
since it prevents unnecessary merging of databases. The policy has, in
principle, been embraced by the Dutch government,20' and the medical
sector advised to adopt a sectoral Care Identification Number (Zorg
Identificatie Nummer, ZIN) for each citizen. However, a study on the
costs this would create for health-care insurance companies and health-
care providers now seems to tilt the balance instead towards adoption of
the generic Citizen Service Number (BurgerServiceNummer, BSN) that
is currently being developed as an overarching government ID number.08
206. J.A.G. VERMISSEN & A.C.M. DE HEIJ, COLLEGE BESCHERMING PERSOONS-
GEGEVENS, ELEKTRONISCHE OVERHEID EN PRIVACY: BESCHERMING VAN PERSOONSGEGEVENS
IN DE INFORMATIE-INFRASTRUCTUUR VAN DE OVERHEAD [ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT AND
PRIVACY: PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN THE INFORMATION STRUCTURE OF GOVERN-
MENT] 16-17 (2002), available at http://www.cbpweb.org/downloads-av/av25.pdf.
207. See CONTRACT WITH THE FUTURE, supra note 193, at 41.
208. See M.A. BRENDA, ZORG INDENTIFICATIE NUMMER: ONDERZOEK CONSEQUENTIES
INVOERING ZIN VOOR ZORGVERZEKERAARS EN ZORGAANBIEDERS [Care Identification Num-
ber: Researching Consequences of Setting-Up CIN for Care Insurers and Care Providers],
available at http:www/nictiz.nl/kr-nictiz/default.asp?datoom=1900; Uniek Zorgnummer op
Losse Schroeven [Unique Care Number on Loose Propellers], AUTOMATISERING GIDS
[AUTOMATION GUIDE], Mar. 12, 2004, http://www.automatiseringsgids.nl/news/default.asp?
nwsld=26437.
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Efficiency, therefore, is a primary reason not to diversify identification
systems.
2. Case 2: Using Citizen Data for Secondary Purposes
The previous case discussed data interoperability for the benefit of
citizens. These same mechanisms can also be used against citizens.
Combating fraud is such an example of the use of data interchange that
easily springs to mind. In order to combat fraud with General Assistance
benefits in the Netherlands, data is exchanged between the local General
Assistance Offices (GSD), the Office for Employee Insurances (UWV),
the Tax Authorities (Belastingdienst), and the Information Management
Group (IB-Groep), by means of a gateway maintained by the Intelli-
gence Agency (Inlichtingenbureau).
But also in the case of legitimate citizen behavior, data exchange can
be used against the citizen. The reliance on single cross-sector identifica-
tion numbers facilitates "cross-fertilization" of services. For example,
databases on hospitalization might be merged with other databases in
order to make profiles of people that have a high "hospital risk"; insur-
ance companies might subsequently use such profiles to diversify
insurance costs. Although we are not aware of serious forms of "cross-
fertilizing" of government services at present, software that enables such
data merging exists, and thus, at least in theory, allows the creation of
new policy instruments. For instance, you only receive a rental allow-
ance if you have paid all your fines. Or, your monthly social-security
benefit is decreased if you drive a car and have taken a plane twice in a
year (thus polluting the environment more than the average citizen); or,
your request for a building permit is processed with priority if you have
submitted your income tax on time over the past five years. There may
be some citizens who appreciate such schemes, but others will feel
threatened that government agencies know details of their lives the agen-
cies do not need to know to do their proper job.
Misuse of data sources is facilitated by the developments sketched.
Interrelated government databases allow, for instance, social-security
permitting agencies to see whether someone has yet to pay a speed-
driving ticket or the tax authorities to check how often someone has en-
tered a prison to visit an inmate. This is not only a theoretical threat. At
present, police officers already consult vehicle registration information
for personal use2°9 and social welfare employees are known to have used
209. See JAN NAEYt ET. AL, INTEGRITEIT IN HET DAGELIJKS POLITIEWERK: MENINGEN
EN ERVARINGEN VAN POLITIEMENSEN [INTEGRITY IN DAILY POLICE WORK: OPINIONS AND
EXPERIENCE OF POLICEMEN] (2004); Agenten Misbruiken Massaal Politie-Informatie
[Agents Massively Abuse Police Force Information], JUROFOON, Apr. 22, 2004, http://
www.jurofoon.nl/nieuws/weblog.asp?id=1 141.
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data for other purposes than social welfare. These malpractices relate to
individual databases, but there is no reason to assume it will not happen
when the data sources become even richer via cross-linking. On the con-
trary, the enlargement of both the databases' scope and the number of
people who have access to them increase the risk of "interesting excur-
sions" and misuse.
3. Balance
Within the public sector, "code" is affecting the balance between
privacy and what "the government" knows of its citizens. In the case of
e-government the problem is not so much the government prying deeper
into the private sphere by collecting previously unavailable data. Instead,
the problem is the combination of data already available to government,
albeit to distinct organizations and agencies. Whereas the citizen used to
present only a fragment of himself to a particular government agency,
the agency in question increasingly is capable of recollecting the citi-
zen's other fragments, as well, by linking-up with other government
agencies.
The principal driving forces that lead to increasingly transparent
citizens are efficiency gains for both government and citizen, greater
convenience for the citizen,2 '0 but also equality before the law since pre-
venting or fighting fraud can be seen as a way to give everyone his
rightful share. In a sense, one can even argue that privacy values such as
individuality and integrity, the desire to be seen as an individual person
and not to be flattened out, are served by data interoperability since it
allows more aspects of the citizen to be taken into account in delivering
services. However, on balance, one must acknowledge that citizens be-
come more transparent as a result of pro-active service delivery and the
associated integration and interoperability of data sources. The moderni-
zation of government, embodied in the aims to improve efficiency and
service delivery, seems to prevail over privacy interests.1
It is unclear whether citizens care about their loss of privacy. Re-
gardless, whether it is really necessary to affect the privacy of citizens in
the present manner to achieve the goals as set out remains an interesting
question. Is it possible to deliver pro-active services, to increase effi-
ciency, and to improve convenience without invading people's private
spheres more than before? The answer to this question, according to
some, is yes. A balance between privacy-protection interests and effi-
210. The Dutch tax authorities cleverly market this kind of benefits in their slogan: "We
can't make it nicer for you, but we can make it more convenient."
211. See Perri 6, supra note 190, at 111.
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ciency and service-delivery improvements can be maintained.2 2 What
advocates propose is to maintain a balance through implementing "pri-
vacy by design"-implementing privacy protection in code by adopting
PETs and by maintaining data walls between sectors. Applications can
be constructed in such a way that only the necessary minimum of infor-
mation is revealed. For instance, for a housing benefit, the responsible
agency need not know the income of a citizen, they only need to request
the tax department to report whether or not the citizen's income is below
the relevant threshold. This is an application of the PET notion, as intro-
duced by the Dutch and Ontarian Data Protection Authorities: construct
technology in a way that the minimum amount of data necessary for the
specific goal is used and shield-off all other information.2 3
But why do such alternatives to sacrificing privacy for the improve-
ment of efficiency and service delivery not seem to be used in practice?
This may well be unintentional. Maybe it is more a case of unawareness
or lack of appreciation of the privacy-enhancing possibilities of technol-
ogy. Also, the cost of implementing proper privacy-protecting "code"
may be deemed too high. Policy makers and systems developers are
hardly aware of the alternatives to personalized access to services.
It is too easily assumed that government access to citizen data is es-
sential to improve service delivery. For instance, it is usually taken for
granted that the government should know the identity of the citizen to
perform any task or service. But this is often not the case. For example,
when a neighborhood planning committee collects comments from citi-
zens through a website, it will usually collect names and addresses of the
participants to be able to check whether only people with a genuine in-
terest in the neighborhood participate. If there is a requirement of only
being permitted to participate in the online hearing when one actually
lives in the neighborhood, then one could use other, less privacy-
invasive, checks as well. The check on neighborhood residency can be
done by another agency than the one running the online hearing. De-
pending on the desired level of security, technology can facilitate such
privacy-friendly verification in numerous ways, from anonymous or
212. See VERMISSEN, supra note 206; George Radwansky, Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, The Privacy Challenge: Connecting Citizens with All Levels of Government (May 9,
2002), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/02_05_a_020509_e.asp; cf C. Bellamy,
Perri 6 & C. Raab, Joined-Up Government and Privacy in the United Kingdom: Managing
Tensions between Data Protection and Social Policy, Part H, 83 PuB. ADMIN. 393, 412-13
("Certainly, there is no general balance between privacy and data sharing. Rather, settlements
are worked out in particular vertically-defined policy fields, and vary in relation to different
privacy risks and data protection principles. Nor is there any single agency responsible for
striking a 'balance.' ").
213. REGISTRATIEKAMER, 2 PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: THE PATH TO ANO-
NYMITY 22 (1995), available at http://www.ipc.on.ca/docs/anoni-v2.pdf.
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pseudonymous smart cards with biometrics a municipality provides each
citizen to merely publishing a generic access code in the local newspa-
per.
Indeed, biometrics is a technology that may be used in a non-
identifying way, allowing compartmented access to relevant characteris-
tics of a person stored on a smart card. In practice, however, biometrics
is usually viewed only as a technology for identification, and it is used in
a privacy-threatening, rather than a privacy-enhancing, way.
D. Commerce
Electronic commerce is somewhat similar to e-government, in that
the central idea is doing traditional things in new, electronic ways with
kindred interests of efficiency and serviceability. Added, however, are
commercial interests: businesses have a significant interest in collecting
data about customers, their habits, and their interests in order to target
current or potential customers in a more effective, personalized way.
Moreover, e-mail addresses and profiles are increasingly being treated as
commodities in themselves, leading to multiple and largely invisible
streams of personal-data traffic across the world. Numerous "code" de-
velopments facilitate this collection, use, and spread of personal data in
the context of e-commerce, from having people fill out web forms with
personal data to more covert techniques such as cookies and spyware
and from merging databases with profiles to transaction monitoring to
create new information.
Although the nature of such activities is nothing new compared to
what happened in traditional brick-and-mortar business, the scale and
ease of processing personal data have increased significantly enough to
warrant the statement that the balance is tipping in the direction of com-
mercial interests to the detriment of informational privacy. This entails
various risks, such as the denying of goods or services to consumers with
a "wrong" profile, showing higher prices on a website based on a "high-
risk" profile, or allowing only customers with a "right" profile to pay
afterwards; this happens regardless of whether the individual in the zip-
code area indeed has a low income. Moreover, personalized commercial
communications may give the consumer the eerie feeling that "this com-
pany knows everything about me." Or consumers may feel offended
when they search for something and the website shows them related
goods or services (when you look for Hiroshige prints, the web page
prompts: "persons who bought this book also enjoy reading Erotic Japa-
nese Woodcuts," showing an image of the eroticizing cover). Although
the privacy-related harm in such cases does not seem very great, in cer-
tain circumstances, the effects of businesses knowing more about the
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consumers than is necessary for distinct, solicited transactions can be
grave, particularly when someone has many characteristics of uninterest-
ing or high-risk groups and when no alternative ways are left to conduct
business in a more privacy-friendly way. In the following cases, we illus-
trate the ways in which technology nibbles at data protection of citizens
and how, sometimes, the government adopts commercial uses of data.
1. Case 1: Transaction Monitoring in Mobile
214Telephony and Banking
Carrying out transactions, especially electronic transactions, gener-
ates data. This is also true for the mobile telephony and banking
industries. Mobile telephone operators, for instance, obviously need to
know the phone numbers of both the caller and the recipient to establish
a connection. They also need to keep track of the call's duration for bill-
ing purposes as most phone operators use time base billing. Similarly,
banks need to know the account numbers of payors and payees as well as
the amounts of transfers when money is transferred between accounts or
when money is deposited or withdrawn. So, the main reason for collect-
ing transaction data is the proper functioning of transaction systems
themselves.
However, transaction data may also be used for secondary purposes.
Suspects in a Dutch high-profile child murder case, for instance, were
located in Spain following a cash withdrawal from a cash dispenser."'
Transaction data generated during mobile phone calls or financial trans-
actions may also be used to build profiles of the behavior of individual
customers. Since about 2000, monitoring systems have been available to
do just that. Some mobile phone system operators use this type of elec-
tronic monitoring to detect theft, payment fraud, and identity fraud. The
monitoring software builds and maintains individual customer profiles
and notices radical changes in customer's behavioral pattern. When a
mobile phone is stolen or lost and later used by someone other than the
owner, this will be noted by the monitoring system. The new user is
likely to produce a calling pattern that is completely different from the
owner's pattern. The profiles can also be used to notice defaulters. When
a customer fails to pay his bills (defaults), he will ultimately be discon-
nected from the service. If the defaulter were to reapply for the service
and be accepted, for instance, because of the use of a false name, the
214. This section is based on ANTONIUS ADRIANUS PETRUS SCHUDELARO, ELECTRONIC
PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND MONEY LAUNDERING: RISKS AND COUNTERMEASURES IN THE POST-
INTERNET HYPE ERA (2003).
215. See Moeder Rowena Aangehouden in Spanje [Rowena's Mother Apprehended in
Spain], RTLNIEUWS.NL, Dec. 20, 2001, http://rtl.nl/(/actueel/rtlnieuws/)/components/actueel/
rtlnieuws/1 2_december/19/buitenland/rowena.xml.
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monitoring system would recognize this customer's behavioral patterns
as one of a known defaulter. The phone numbers used and also the gen-
eral calling behavior will match. Consequently, the service could be
discontinued again.
Applications of behavioral monitoring, such as fraud detection and
the detection of commercial opportunities, are important in the financial
world, too. Electronic monitoring is used, for instance, during customer
acceptance and credit-scoring procedures. By analyzing various types of
data, providers of financial services can, on one hand, assess the com-
mercial potential of a future customer. On the other hand, data analysis
can also be used to assess whether acceptance of a potential customer is
likely to result in a bad debt or whether other grounds exist to reject an
applicant. Additionally, behavioral monitoring also can be used after ap-
plicants have been accepted. Once transactions have begun, behavioral
monitoring can detect behavior that exceeds certain predefined limits or
to make profiles of the behavior of individual customers based on the
type, number, and frequency of the transactions they make, when, where,
how, and with whom they make them, the amount of money involved, or
other criteria. All of the data can be linked to names and account num-
bers. The data obtained through this kind of transaction monitoring is not
only valuable from a risk-assessment, fraud-detection, or commercial-
opportunity point of view, but it can be valuable for law-enforcement
purposes. For instance, behavioral monitoring may be used to detect and
investigate money laundering. 6
Thus, we see in the mobile-phone and banking sectors the emer-
gence of monitoring as an effect of technology developing in such a way
that consumer data can be merged and analyzed. This enables close scru-
tiny of communication patterns and transaction behavior, which is used
not only for fraud-prevention and fraud-detection purposes but also for
commercial purposes. As a side-effect, the government may step in and
use the monitoring capabilities that have emerged in the private sector;
they may even make data collection and monitoring mandatory for law-
enforcement purposes to combat telecommunications fraud and money
laundering.
2. Case 2: Tag, You're It: RFID Will Get You"1 7
There has always been a need to identify and trace products. For this
reason, products carry manufacturer and product codes, and since the
216. In many countries, the banks are required to report remarkable transactions to the
tax authorities. See Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118 (1970) (codified at 31
U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322).
217. The Ontario Privacy Commissioner's report title inspires this subtitle. CAVOUKIAN,
supra, note 124.
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1970s, many products also carry a UPC (universal product code) or bar-
code number. Barcodes have to be read by optical scanners and, hence,
have to be visible to the scanner. This limits the use of the technology.
Using radio signals instead of optical scanning alleviates the line-of-
sight problem and opens up new possibilities and uses for product tags.
Recent advances in technology have made possible the production of
Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags with very small footprints
and low cost.
An RFID system consists of a tag capable of transmitting, and some-
times receiving, information by means of radio signals. A radio receiver
can pick up these radio signals for further processing. In comparison to
optical scanning, reading RFID tags is quick: they can be read at seven
items a second. Another clear advantage over optical tags is the fact they
can be read even if they are covered by fog, snow, paint, or cardboard.
RFID tags come in various flavors.2 8 Some tags carry chips that can
hold a larger amount of data and can process data (for encryption or veri-
fication); they may even contain sensors (to measure temperature, for
instance). Chipless tags offer fewer capabilities as they lack a mi-
crocprocessor (the chip) capable of processing and storing data. These
chipless tags can store a more limited amount of data (typically 24 bits)
and are cheaper to produce than chip-carrying tags. Another distinction
relates to the power source driving the tag. A reader, with a limited range
stretching about 10 meters, activates and powers passive tags. The ad-
vantage of these tags is that they do not need their own power source that
can run out of power, and, hence, they can operate indefinitely, at least in
theory. Active tags contain a power source and an active transmitter ca-
pable of sending the signal over a larger distance (up to several
kilometers). Passive tags are smaller and cheaper to produce than active
tags. They are usually read-only tags that cannot be changed after pro-
duction time. More expensive tags can be changed, or written to, after
production.
The price of passive tags at present is in the order of O. 15-0.50 for
quantities of 100,000. This means that at present, they are not suitable
for cheap mass consumer products. Prices are expected to drop to less
than $0.05 a piece." 9 This would make them suitable to replace barcodes
on most products and enter the supermarkets with possibly far reaching
consequences for both suppliers and consumers.
218. See id. at 5-6.
219. See AUTO-ID CENTER, THE NEW NETWORK: IDENTIFY ANY OBJECT ANYWHERE
AUTOMATICALLY 3 (2002), available at http://www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/automation/documents/
centerguide.pdf.
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RFID tags carry a number and, as such, create opportunities to associ-
ate meaningful data to the item carrying the tag. The tag's identification
signal itself may contain information, such as the producer, product type,
size, color, production date, and toxicity. But it can also contain a unique
identification code. Together these types of data in the tags open up vast
possibilities to relate information to the tag. In its simple form only the
meaningful data on the tag is used. The information can be used to provide
location information, for instance, in supply chains or buildings, or for
billing purposes at the counter. The specific data about the tagged item,
such as color, size, and production date, may be used by, for instance,
washing machines ("Are you sure you want to wash this purple sock to-
gether with your white laundry?") or fridges ("You had better finish your
milk, which is nearing its best-before date.").
When the data in the tags are associated with external data (stored in
databases), the possibilities to track and trace items increases even more.
The history of individual items can easily be stored and maintained
throughout a tag's life-cycle. This also, of course, could be done with
other types of tags, such as barcodes, but RFID data is easier to read,
both in amount, as well as in effort; reading a bar code with 256 charac-
ters takes more effort than reading these from an RFID tag.
Current applications are relatively limited in scale due to the cost of
present tags. But there are many plans to implement tags in large num-
bers. Esso (SpeedPass) and Shell (EasyPay) use RFID tags in payment
systems. SpeedPass users have a key tag incorporating an RFID tag that
allows them to pay for their gas without using cash or credit card.220
Many organizations, such as Tilburg University, have personal RFID
cards to access office buildings. More practical for forgetful workers is
the "chipping" of Mexican Ministry of Justice employees to access se-
cure rooms in the Ministry.22' Household pets and cattle are tagged with
RFID tags embedded in glass tubes for identification purposes. For cat-
tle, they could replace the yellow ear-tags currently used for cattle in the
Netherlands. A number of large seaport operators are installing tags on
the containers they process. Employees in the harbors are also equipped
with tags, allowing a detailed log of who has been involved with particu-• 222
lar containers. In Alexandria Hospital in Singapore, every patient,
220. JOHN A. WOLFF, IBM GLOBAL SERVICES, RFID TAGS: AN INTELLIGENT BAR CODE
REPLACEMENT 7 (2001), available at http://www.qinetiq.comhome-ep/insight/insight
_archive_may_2004/electronicjtagging.SupportingPar.0001.File.pdf.
221. Associated Press, Update 7: Chip Implanted in Mexico Judicial Workers,
FORBES.COM, 15 July 2004, http://www.forbes.com/associatedpress/feeds/ap/2004/07/15/
ap1457329.html.
222. See Ports to Adopt RFID Security System, RFIDJOURNAL.COM, July 17, 2002,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/26/l/1/.
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visitor, and staff member was issued an RFID card after the SARS out-
break in the spring of 2003.223 This allowed all movements of people
within the hospital to be traced. In the event of a new SARS victim, this
information could be used to quickly establish with whom the victim has
had contact. 4 Delta Air Lines is testing RFID tags attached to baggage
221to make tracking and tracing of luggage easier. In the U.K., car license
plates may be equipped with RFID to automatically identify cars travel-
226ing with speeds up to 320 km/h from up to 100 meters away.
Large supermarket and retail chains are interested in using RFID
tags on their goods because it will allow them to streamline the supply
chain. Boxes with items can be inspected without a need to open them,
and "smart shelves" are envisioned to signal staff when they need replen-
ishing. The American Wal-Mart chain, which was also a main driving
force in introducing the barcode in 1984, intends to introduce RFID tags
in conjunction with its top-100 suppliers. In the U.K., the Tesco chain
started a pilot project in a store in Cambridge. Gillette, Wal-Mart and
Tesco co-operate in the RFID experiments. 7 Prada shoes has plans to
implement RFID tags. They have also piloted RFID closets in some of
their New York stores that respond to the garment taken into the dressing
room. An interactive touch screen "enables the customer to select alter-
native sizes, colors, fabrics, and styles, or see the garment worn on the
PRADA catwalk as slow-motion video clips. '28 Benetton and Marks and
Spencer in the U.K. have announced plans to incorporate tags in cloth-
ing.229 At the Tokyo International Bookfair 2003, a system was
demonstrated that allows detailed in-store observation of people brows-
ing books and magazines. "By placing tag readers on the shelves of
bookstores, the new system allows booksellers to gain information such
as the range of books a shopper has browsed, how many times a particu-
lar title was picked up and even the length of time spent flipping through
223. See Singapore Fights SARS with RFID, RFIDJOURNAL.COM, June 4, 2003,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/arficle/articleview/446/l/l/.
224. In theory, this kind of tagging could also enable finding patient "zero," the patient
who first shows the symptoms of a disease.
225. See Jason Collins, Delta Plans U.S.-Wide System, RFIDJoURNAL.COM, July 2,
2004, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/1013.
226. RFID-enabled License Plates to Identify UK Vehicles, RFIDNEws, June 10, 2004,
http://www.rfidnews.org/news/2004/06/10/rfidenabled-license-plates-to-identify-uk-vehicles/.
227. See Aloire Gilbert, Wal-Mart Tagging Fuels RFID Market, ZDNEWS.coM, Dec. 22,
2004, http://news.zdnet.con/2100-9584_22-5501432.html.
228. Case Studies, Prada RFID Closet, http://www.ideo.corncase-studies/prada.asp?x=5
(last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
229. See Benetton to Tag 15 Million Items, RFIDJOURNAL.COM, Mar. 12, 2003, http://
www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/344/l/l/.
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each book."23 Moreover, the European Central Bank considers embed-
ding hair-thin RFID tags in Euro notes in order to combat counterfeiting,
black-market transactions, and money laundering.23" '
A final application of radiofrequency identification chips is to label
people. The American company Applied Digital Solutions is marketing
chips (VeriChip) which can be implanted into humans. 32 These chips
were at first coined as a means to keep track of children. If a person car-
rying such a chip goes missing or is abducted, chip-reading devices can
be placed in the search area in an effort to track down the missing per-
son.233 But other uses were soon found. The Baja Beach Club (with
venues in Rotterdam and Barcelona) offers their members the option to
have a VeriChip implanted for C25 to replace the traditional membership
card.3 The embedded chip offers their carrier the guarantee that he does
not have to queue or reserve tables, and, perhaps most importantly, it
allows him to order drinks to be put on his tab. "The bartender simply
pings you with a handheld scanner.' 235 What the chip carriers probably
do not realize is that they can also be "pinged" outside of the Baja Beach
Club, perhaps by a local pub owner who dislikes Baja Beach braggers
and refuses them entry or by the local police officer interested in how
much the Club member had to drink.
The current applications are fairly straightforward and do not tilt the
privacy balance too much. Objects can be identified by reading their tag:
hence, their location can be established, or action can be undertaken on
the basis of the identity. But looking further in the future, uses can be
foreseen that cross the border of proportional use.
An obvious use of RFID tags is personalization of services. Objects
and information displays may offer personalized responses and informa-
tion, depending on the tag that is in its vicinity. Razors and electric
toothbrushes could trigger intelligent mirrors, that is, mirrors equipped
with a display, to provide specific training or use instructions. Shopping
windows can have displays that show personalized information and dis-
counts on the basis of tags worn by a passer-by.236 In museums, the
230. RFID POSITION STATEMENT OF CONSUMER PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OR-
GANIZATIONS (2003), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RFIDposition.htm (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting NIKKEI ELECTRONIC NEWS).
231. See Junko Yoshida, Euro Bank Notes to Embed RFID Chips by 2005, EETIMES
ONLINE, Dec. 19, 2001, http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20011219S0016.
232. See VeriChip Corp., http://www.verichipcorp.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
233. See VeriChip Corp., Infant Protection, http://www.verichipcorp.com/content/
solutions/infant-protection.
234. See David Pescovitz, RFID Chips for VIPs, THEFEATURE.COM, May 22, 2004,
http://www.thefeaturearchives.com/100662.html.
235. Id.
236. An already famous example is the scene in the movie Minority Report
(Cruise/Wagner Productions 2002), where John Anderton (Tom Cruise) passes shop windows
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various exhibits could provide tailored audio and visual information to
the person viewing the object. The REID tags in Euro notes to counter
forgery, black-market transactions, and blackmailing, may be read by
law-enforcement agencies to search for fraudulent or stolen money-but
also by criminals interested in scanning wallets to find the right wallet to
pickpocket.
Radio tags can have a long lifespan, as passive tags can be read long
after they have served their intended purpose. Price tags on products, for
instance, can be read after the client leaves a shop. The widespread use
of RFID tags, thus, can lead easily to profiling and monitoring. Corpora-
tions, but also governments, can track people by following the tags they
wear or carry. Since tags can have an individual identification code, trac-
ing individuals is possible. Moreover, combining data on the various tags
a person carries allows for sophisticated monitoring of lifestyles and
habits. For instance, someone entering a Shell station with a car
equipped with Michelin tires, wearing Prada shoes and clothing, and
paying with her EasyPay card, leaves a trace from both her shoes and her
car tires. If this information is combined with purchases in shops, she
runs the risk of becoming completely transparent. The purchases at
Prada that could have been anonymous with cash, end up not to be
anonymous; the EasyPay card gives away the customer's identity, if
linked by willing retailers. This may all occur without her being aware of
it: for one thing, people will rarely notice the tags, and if they do, they
will tend to regard them as just another barcode, not realizing the RFID
tags' tracking potential.
Thus, the use of RFID tags may seriously impact informational pri-
vacy.237 Data from the tags can be collected without the carriers' explicit
consent, even possibly without them being aware of the tag's existence.
Invasion into people's personal lives is even greater if identity papers
such as passports and driver's licenses are tagged or if RFID tags like the
VeriChip are implanted. This allows for constant tracking of people. A
news item at CNet gave a preview of people tracking: "Delegates to the
recent Communist Party Congress were required to wear an RFID badge
that not only show commercials, but also personally address passersby to draw their attention:
"John Anderton, you look like you could use a Guiness." Recognition in the movie is done by
a retinal scan, but RFID could be used just as well.
237. See Nissenbaum, supra note 99, at 135 ("RFID tags ... significantly alter the na-
ture and distribution patterns of information"); RFID POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 230;
GAL ESCHET, A NEW CHALLENGE TO PRIVACY MANAGEMENT: ADAPTING FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES TO RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY, MORRISON & FOERSTER
LLP (2004), http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafabstractid=557441.
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equipped with the tiny tag, which permitted their movements around the
conference to be constantly tracked and recorded."'238
Opposition to the use of radio tags is rising from privacy watchdogs,
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Centre (EPIC), the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and
European Digital Rights (EDRi),239 and from consumer organizations,
individual consumers, and recently also politicians. As a result of the
fierce opposition, many forerunners of RFID use-Bennetton, Wal-Mart,
Prada, and Gillette among them-have retracted, or at least changed,
their plans.24 Nevertheless, we think it is inescapable that tags will be
increasingly used in products, because the benefits for commerce are
simply too great. The real issue is how they will be used, for how long
they will be used, and who will be able to read them under what condi-
tions.
3. Blocking RFID
RFID tags can, as we have seen, pose serious threats to a person's
informational privacy and allow a person or object's location to be
traced. But resistance is not futile. There are various ways in which
RFID tags can be disabled. First, the tags can be destroyed physically,
for instance by smashing the tag or by "cooking" them in a microwave
oven, which destroys the chip by overloading the circuitry with high-
energy radio waves. Second, since RFID tags use radio signals to com-
municate with tag readers, traditional radio jamming can be used to
disrupt data communication between tag and reader. Therefore, the tags
can be shielded by metal foil to prevent radio waves from entering or
leaving the tag.
Intelligent forms of misleading the readers are also under develop-
ment. RSA Security is experimenting with "Blocker Tags." These tags
can block RFID tags from being read by sending out fabricated data se-
lectively (for example, only the range of tag id's assigned to Prada
shoes) or universally. If embedded in a shopping bag, for instance, the
238. China Raises the Red Tag, in Random Access, CNET.COM, May 2003, available at
http://www.rflink.co.kr/board/content.asp?idx=59&page=3&cate=e-rflink&search=&searchst
ring=.
239. See, e.g., RFID POSITION STATEMENT, supra, note 230. Californian State Senator
Debra Bowen proposed legislation to require persons or entities that use RFID tags to comply
with certain conditions, such as an obligation to get an individual's written consent before
collecting RFID data and the obligation to destroy or incapacitate the tags once a customer
leaves a shop. See SB 1834, 2004, 2003-2004 Legislature (Cal. 2004). The bill failed. See
Claire Swedberg, California RFID Legislation Rejected, RFIDJOURNAL.COM, July 5, 2004,
http://www.rfidjoumal.com/article/articleview/1015/1/1/.
240. See Elisa Batista, "Step Back" for Wireless ID Tech?, WIRED.COM, Apr. 8, 2003,
http://www.wired.comnews/wireless/1,58385-0.html.
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blocker tags provide a designated privacy zone: if the item is inside the
bag, it cannot be read, but if it is removed, it can be read .'
Another way to disable RFID tags is by deactivating the tags once
they have served their purpose. The MIT Auto-ID Center has proposed
including a "kill switch" into the RFID specifications.4 2 A number of
RFID manufacturers, such as Philips Semiconductors have announced
they will do So.243 Chips that implement the kill switch can be disabled
on checkout by the reader if the customer requests so. A requirement in
that scenario, of course, is that the customer is aware of the tag and its
risks; even then, he may not be fully assured that the tag is actually dis-
abled or that it will not be switched on again.
4. Balance
As in the case of e-government, technology facilitates large-scale in-
formation collection as well as information shielding, but it tends to
favor only the former. The case of transaction monitoring eminently il-
lustrates the power of IT to combine data. Through its use for fraud-
detection, it is being widely employed, and, as a side-effect, may also
serve other purposes, such as marketing or law enforcement. In fact,
RFID, even though it is not yet as widely developed as transaction moni-
toring, shows similar aspects: it offers a host of information and data
trails, which can be primarily created for specific purposes-for in-
stance, streamlining supply chains, controlling access, or personalizing
services-but which may subsequently be put to various other uses.
RFID also illustrates the natural tendency of technology to create and
spread data rather than contain it:244 only after substantial protests from
civil society has industry become aware of potential privacy threats and
looked for ways to contain these.
Privacy-enhancing technologies, such as anonymizers, cookie
crunchers, RFID blockers, and anti-spyware tools, can be used to curb
data collection, but consumers have to make an effort (and bear certain
costs) to protect their privacy with these tools and techniques. Moreover,
often consumers are not aware of the covert data collection that is taking
241. See Ari Juels, Ronald L. Rivest & Michael Szydlo, The Blocker Tag: Selective
Blocking of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy, in 10TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER
AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 103 (Vijay Atluri ed., 2003), available at http://
www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2060.
242. See CAVOUKIAN, supra note 124, at 19.
243. See Posting of Pbecker to Digital ID World Editor's Comer, http://
blog.digitalidworld.comlarchives/000433.html (June 12, 2003, 10:15 MDT).
244. Or, to (mis)use part of the slogan attributed to Steward Brand: "Information wants
to be free." Keep Designing: How the Information Economy is Being Created and Shaped by
the Hacker Ethic, WHOLE EARTH REV., May 1985, at 44, 49 (transcript of program at Hackers
Conference, Nov. 9-11, 1984).
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place in (e-)commerce, and they do not bother to use PETs. And al-
though it is conceivable that privacy-enhancing "code" is built-in more
in infrastructures and services, so far, little progress seems to be made in
that area. The interests at stake, cost, convenience, and preventing and
monitoring fraud, simply seem to favor privacy-threatening technology
much more than privacy-friendly "code."
IV. THE EFFECTS OF "CODE" ON PRIVACY
What picture emerges from the tour d'horizon of "code"-influenced
privacy? There is a clear common thread in all of the domains that we
analyzed. Privacy-related norms are rarely explicitly built into technol-
ogy. As such, a Lessigish privacy "code" or a Reidenbergian lex
informatica vitae privatae does not exist. Technology, in particular soft-
ware and Internet architecture, rarely incorporates specific privacy-
related norms. The few existing exceptions concern building-in an option
245of privacy violation, such as interceptability of telecommunications.
At the same time, however, technology very often does have clear ef-
fects on privacy. Technology affects the "reasonable expectation of
privacy"-it partly shapes what can be deemed "necessary in a democ-
ratic society" when it comes to deciding what privacy violations are
acceptable. In the vast majority of technologies developed and used in
real life, its influence is to the detriment of privacy. That is, technology
often has the side-effect of making privacy violations easier. Particularly,
information technology turns out to be a technology of control. Although
at a theoretical level, it is a technology of freedom, in practice, it rarely
functions as such. Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) have been de-
vised and propagated, but they have yet to be implemented on any
serious scale.
This conclusion holds for both the public and private domain. Ex-
amples in law enforcement and e-government show technology offers
increasing opportunities for large-scale monitoring-from intercepting
all telecommunications (and there is a lot of telecommunications nowa-
days) to monitoring the movements of people. In the private sector,
technology enables more control of people, from workplace and transac-
tion monitoring to personalization of consumer relationships, with new
applications like facial recognition and RFID monitoring looming ahead.
This is understandable. One of the prime attributes of information
and communications technology is that it enables sharing of information
rather than shielding or compartmentalizing information. And the people
245. See supra Part III.A. 1.
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who usually decide on how technology is applied are precisely the peo-
ple on the strong side of power relations-governments, businesses, and
employers-who have an interest in gathering information about the
people on the other side so they can maintain or expand their power ba-
sis.
This is not to say that people in power always consciously exploit
technology for control purposes, but it does mean that there is little in-
centive to look deep into the effects of new technologies for privacy. If
more control is possible via a new application, though that is not what
the application was made for, it is fine nonetheless. People gladly adopt
the new possibilities. In fact, after a lapse of time, one gets so used to
this new control mechanism that one may no longer perceive it as a side-
effect but as an intrinsic-and perhaps intended--characteristic of the
technology. This is when the "reasonableness" of a privacy expectation
shifts: once the new technology is accepted as being inherently control-
friendly, there no longer is a reasonable expectation that this control is
not exerted. At that point, since control is also a primary interest to gov-
ernments in their law-and-order role, the control characteristic may also
be mandated by law. Non-interceptable telecommunications is forbidden
because the police have become so accustomed to intercepting telecom-
munications that a large part of their work is based on this method.
Identification is made obligatory because government employees feel
they simply have to know the identity of citizens in order to be able to do
their jobs.
The eroding effect of technology on privacy is thus a slow, hardly
perceptible process. There is no precise stage at which one can stab a
finger at technology to accuse it of unreasonably tilting the balance of
privacy. Exactly because of the flexible, fluid nature of privacy, society
gradually adapts to new technologies and the privacy expectations that
go with them. If one is to stop this almost natural process, a conscious
effort and considerable resources are required.
V. EVALUATION OF "CODE" AND PRIVACY
We now return to the initial question that triggered this research:
how does "code" relate to privacy? How should we perceive the notion
of "code as law" when it comes to privacy regulation? We turn to several
questions that relate to the legitimacy of "code" as law.2"
246. For an elaboration of these questions, see Lodewijk Asscher's chapter in CODING
REGULATION, supra note t.
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A. Can Rules Be Distinguished in the Code?
Only rarely does code include specific privacy-related rules. One ex-
ample is interceptability of telecommunications, where the built-in
"rule" is that the government must have an option to intercept telecom-
munications if it so wants. Other examples are PETs, such as
anonymizers and RFID blockers; here, the "rule" is that one must be able
to use technology in an anonymous, unsupervised way. Even though
such norms are not legal rules in the sense of "Thou shalt not kill," one
can see them as expressing rights: everyone has the right to anonymity;
the government has the right to intercept. It is stretching things a bit to
see them as constituting these rights themselves, though; rather, they are
enforcement mechanisms of such rights.
In the vast majority of technologies, however, there are no privacy-
related "rules." The technology just often happens to facilitate control,
but this is not a consciously built-in characteristic that could count as a
rule.
Nevertheless, one might want to qualify this conclusion. It is true
that rules are not consciously embedded, but given the scale and serious-
ness of the privacy-threatening side-effects, one could view privacy-
curbing "rules" as being negligently built-in in technology. Code devel-
opers, marketeers, and policy-makers, through what Froomkin terms
"privacy myopia,' 24' usually seem to disregard the negative privacy side-
effects of technology, resulting in a substantial erosion of privacy.
Hence, they may be thought to fall to "exercise the standard of care that
a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation"
and, thus, perhaps commit "any conduct that falls below the legal stan-
dard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm," as
a definition of negligence terms it.248 In other words, they are responsi-
ble, nonetheless, for building in privacy erosion in technology.
Although this is perhaps stretching the term "rule" rather far, we are
inclined to think that the development and application of code that negli-
gently fails to take privacy effects into account can indeed be seen as
embedding a "rule" in the technology, namely that privacy is unimpor-
tant and secondary to other values that the code primarily serves. Such
technology indeed does serve to guide or control (what is perceived as)
proper and acceptable behavior, since it considers privacy-infringement
an acceptable outcome of its use.
247. Froomkin, supra note 8, at 1501.
248. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2000).
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B. Can the Rules Be Understood?
Is how code works and what it does understandable? If so, are those
rules transparent; are they accessible to the general public? Can the rules
be trusted; is there any guarantee that rules are not changed during the
game? Are code rules reliable in the sense that they are predictable?
These questions about the transparency and reliability of "code" can
be answered straightforwardly with respect to the "negligently" built-in
value of privacy erosion: this is not transparent, trustworthy, or reliable
in the sense that people know the "rule" and trust it to "work properly."
After all, it is a negative rule, a lack of privacy-awareness, and this void
is not transparent.
With "intentional" code, the answer may be more subtle. Govern-
ment-mandated "code" that enforces control, such as interceptability,
tends to be obscure; this might invite changing the rules along the way,
in the development process or afterwards when "updating" technology.
The debates in the U.S. over CALEA249 and the wide interpretation the
government gave to the interceptability requirement, might be seen as
an example of a fear that what would actually be built-in in the tele-
communications infrastructure was more than mere interceptability. The
culture of secrecy triggers the fear that the built-in rule-interceptability-
functions differently, in an even more privacy-threatening way. One might
say that "code" in its guise of government-mandated control rules is inher-
ently unreliable: unless law enforcement and national security replace
secrecy with openness and open source, there will always remain a hint
of suspicion, justified or not, that technology does more than what the
government says it does. But on issues less dramatic than national secu-
rity, electronic voting for instance, we cannot be sure at all that
government does not monitor the individual voter's preferences," ' unless
open source software is used.252
With PETs, this is not the case. Precisely because people who are
usually ardent defenders of privacy developed them to protect privacy,
there is less risk that the built-in rule-"you can be anonymous; you can
do this without being monitored"-is actually changed. Yet this is not ab-
solute, as the story of NSA-induced backdoors in Crypto AG's
249. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.), available at http://www.askcalea.net/calea.html.
250. See U.S. Telecom. Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, supra note 175, at 51711, and accompanying text.
251. Nor can we be sure that our actual vote is what the voting machines counted.
252. For a list of issues in the 2004 U.S. presidential elections, see Voting Privacy, Elec-
tion Privacy Information Center, http://www.epic.org/privacy/voting/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2005).
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cryptography products suggests.2 3 We do not believe developers of pri-
vacy-enhancing technologies are being routinely infiltrated or convinced
by security agents to build in backdoors. However, given the covert na-
ture and the large interests of national security, particularly in the current
post-9/11 climate, one cannot altogether dismiss the fear that even PET
products produced by privacy-minded people, particularly robust ones
that thwart any kind of control, are being covertly altered.
C. Are "Code" Rules Contradictory?
Do rules pose a logical or, at least, consistent system of regulation?
Do "code" rules require the impossible? In a way, one might view gov-
ernment-mandated privacy-infringing "code" as contradictory with PET
"code." After all, they have opposing goals, and a technology with a
built-in option for privacy infringement clashes with a technology that
has built-in privacy protection. They function, more or less, as an arms
race, with PETs reacting to overintrusive surveillance technologies, and
privacy-infringeable "code" being developed to counteract the threat of
uncrackable PETs to governments. This neatly mirrors the precarious
balancing act of privacy, which is continuously being tugged at by the
interests on both sides of the balance.
Still, this does not need to be the definitive answer. PETs are inter-
esting precisely because they can incorporate shades of privacy
protection. The concept of PET is not so much that it protects privacy
absolutely, but that it enhances the protection of privacy, usually in such
a way that it does not unreasonably restrict other interests at stake. Of-
ten, one can develop technology to threaten privacy not unnecessarily,
while the technology still achieves its primary goal. Particularly, the do-
mains of e-government and commerce lend themselves well to such
PETs: one can easily do business with the government and enterprises
without offering the most intimate details of one's private life.25 Such
PETs can considerably curb the privacy-threatening side-effect of tech-
nology and "negligent code". And so, "code" can offer-in theory, at
least-a consistent system of regulation allowing for degrees of privacy
protection: privacy when possible, infringement when necessary.
253. See Madsen, supra note 186 and accompanying text.
254. Developing these notions is one of the aims of the European Union 6th Framework
Programme and Information Society Technologies projects: "developing solutions to empower
individuals to control their private sphere and manage their abilities." PRIME (Privacy and
Identity Management for Europe), http://www.prime-project.eu.org/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2005).
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D. Is There a Sovereign?
Does authority make the "code" rules? The main authority that
makes "code" rules are code developers, who, through negligence, build
in a slow erosion of privacy.25 However, since this is a process of which
the developers are largely unaware, one cannot really see them as an "au-
thority" similar to a rule-making body. Nevertheless, the minions may
still address them about the rules they unwittingly or carelessly create
with respect to privacy infringement.
With government-mandated enforcement "code," on the other hand,
there is a clear sovereign: the government. If a legitimate legislator-
parliaments and the like-mandates built-in privacy infringeability, there
is no specific problem of "code" legitimacy. If parliament decides that all
telecommunications should be interceptable, then so be it. But if the
"code" should be built-in (hush-hush) at the urge of government in its
guise of national-security protector, there may be more cause for concern
given the intransparency and uncontrollability of such actions.
For PETs, the relevant authority is the technology developer, perhaps
operating sometimes at the urge of Data Protection Authorities and pri-
vacy lobbies and sometimes at the urge of government (as in the case of
Microsoft's .Net passport).
E. Is There a Choice?
Can consumers and citizens choose not to obey the rules? Can citi-
zens and consumers freely choose another system of law or code? The
choice issue is related to the question of consistency. Citizens cannot
choose between interceptable and non-interceptable telecommunications
simply because the built-in interceptability has been made obligatory by
law. But they can choose to use PETs when telecommunicating, counter-
acting the risk of interception. (Or, unpragmatically, they could also
choose to use no telecommunications at all.) In principle, they can
choose any array of technologies that fits their own privacy desires (sup-
posing the PET does not secretly leak).
In practice, however, the choice is more difficult. Choice implies
awareness, and particularly with privacy, there is considerable lack of
awareness among the general public of the potential (mis)uses of tech-
nologies; they can and will be used against you. Choice also implies
affordability, and although anonymizers or RFID blockers do not cost
255. Cf Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv Shah, Deconstructing Code, 2004 YALE J.L. & TECH. 277,
277 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=597543 (distinguishing
between various kinds of code developers and arguing that "code developed by a university is
likely to contain different values and biases, regarding societal concerns such as privacy, than
code developed by a firm").
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millions of euros, they are not free either. More importantly, they are
time-consuming and require a conscious effort to apply as opposed to the
one-click-does-it-all interface to which people have become accustomed.
There is yet another constraint. In doing business, be it with enter-
prises or the government, ihe technology is not consciously privacy-
threatening but facilitates privacy infringements nonetheless. Rarely can
one choose to use a PET in such situations. It is the provider of goods
and service, business or government, who should implement a PET; if
they do not, the citizen or consumer cannot herself decide to use a PET:
the system simply refuses anonymous communications, or it requires
one to fill in fields with personal data that, in principle, has nothing to do
with the good or service at issue (why do they have to know you are fe-
male and the date you were born if you want to e-mail a question to a
government through a web form?). In the commercial domain, one might
look at the market to ensure choice, nevertheless, through use of compa-
nies offering consumers privacy-friendly services. In the public domain,
one-so far-cannot choose between governments to conduct business
with.
F. Do "Code" Rules Conflict With or Alter
Traditional Legal Norms?
The "code" rules seem, at first sight, in line with traditional legal
norms. After all, they are developed precisely to enforce existing norms:
interceptability and PETs both are examples of enforcement-enhancing
technologies that safeguard accepted legal values: law enforcement and
privacy protection.
At second sight, one may be more critical, however. Enforcement
may be built-in not only because it enforces a traditional legal norm but
also because it reinforces this norm. In other words, there is a mutual
influence between legal norms and technology, particularly technologies
of control. As noted above, if technological development facilitates more
control and society continually gets used to new technology, the step of
mandating the technology's control element may appear as a mere appli-
cation of the law, but at the same time, it makes the law stronger than it
ever was. This is because the element of rule-breaking is eliminated.
Where formerly people could circumvent control if they wanted to, even
if the control was consistent with the law, there is no escaping control
with built-in enforcement. In this way, "code" that applies existing legal
norms concurrently makes the legal norm itself absolute.
Now, how does the notion of "code as law" work overall when it
comes to privacy regulation? First, with "code" that negligently incorpo-
rates privacy erosion, there are serious problems. The incorporated
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"rule" is intransparent. There is no clear mechanism for addressing the
authors of such "rules," since they are themselves hardly aware of them
and neither are the policy-makers who could or should address them, and
citizens and consumers hardly have a choice since there is insufficient
supply of privacy-enhanced technologies.
Second, where technology explicitly functions as "code," in a hand-
ful of enforcement-enhancing technologies, such as tools of
interceptable telecommunications and PETs, one can also voice concern
over some elements. Notably, the intransparency of the "code" and the
non-circumventability can be perceived as problematic.
VI. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM, EXACTLY?
Having surveyed and analyzed the relationship between "code" and
privacy, we have noted several problems associated with embedding pri-
vacy-related rules in technology-notably intransparency, the lack of
mechanisms to address the "rule-makers," and the lack of choice. Thus,
we turn to the third part of our research question: does "code" cause
shifts in privacy balances?
It is useful to distinguish two issues at stake, which may require
separate treatment. The first-and minor-issue is intentionally privacy-
related "code." Since only a minority of technologies consciously em-
beds privacy enhancement or privacy infringement, this issue affects
privacy regulation to a minor extent only. Some things can be done to
address flaws in the functioning of this "code" as privacy law, notably to
enhance transparency and to deal with the uncircumventability that
might too radically limit choice.
But perhaps these problems should not be exaggerated. We are talk-
ing about a minor part of the gamut of technology as we use it today,
making the fact that one has no choice but to use this specific privacy-
related technology less consequential. And the "codes" mentioned may
be intransparent because we cannot exclude national-security-urged
backdoors from being built-in; then again, we also cannot exclude the
possibility that the world is teeming with Martians we just happen never
to see because they are smart enough to stay invisible. Moreover, many
traditional legal norms are not particularly transparent either. In short, in
the relatively few cases in which privacy-related norms are built-in ex-
plicitly into technology, there are concerns of transparency and
mandatory compliance, but these concerns may not differ radically from
non-"code" forms of regulation, and perhaps we need not be gravely
concerned that "code" seriously alters existing privacy balances.
Fall 20051
184 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 12:115
This is different in the second, and larger, issue emerging from our
analysis: the slow but gradual erosion of privacy that is a side-effect of
much technological development and that can be seen as the negligent
embedding of privacy infringement in code. The privacy balance clearly
seems at stake. Despite the fact that some scholars have pointed out this
development as a potential "death of privacy,' ' 6 the technological pri-
vacy erosion as such does not currently seem to be a serious academic
and societal debate.57
One explanation for this could be that the gradual erosion of privacy
is a natural process: as technology evolves, we gradually adapt ourselves
to its possibilities, and while these possibilities stress information shar-
ing and monitoring more than information shielding, the reasonable
expectation of privacy is slowly being transformed as well.
Perhaps we should not ask ourselves what are the main problems
with "code" and privacy, but rather, what is the problem anyway? Mi-
chael Froomkin, acting as the devil's advocate, has considered the
possibility that we are dinosaurs, hopping around in a changing world
where we do not see that other species with quite other world views will
soon take over.5 8 Looking back and clinging to privacy protection may
be old-fashioned when we observe youngsters leaving massive data trails
on the Internet and chatting intimate details into mobile phones in pub-
lic, without regard for potential privacy effects. Likewise, consumers
seem almost too willing to sell personal data for small discounts, not
bothering to ask to what uses the data are subsequently put. Although
this argument can be countered with the observation that a large part of
this development is fed through ignorance-most people simply do not
know what is being recorded and what can be and is done to their data-
this still begs the question of how bad the seeming loss of privacy really
is.
In other words, are there real--or realistic-horror stories to show
that things go terribly wrong if "negligently privacy-threatening" tech-
nology develops unheeded? It may be difficult, actually, to pinpoint
concrete examples of "privacy horror." Since privacy is a servant to
many masters,259 it is, in fact, other values that seem at stake. For in-
256. Froomkin, supra, note 8 (note the question mark in the title).
257. "Erosion of privacy" has been debated in the 9/11 context and before, centering on
the United States' Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. Law 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001), the United Kingdom's Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, 23, §§ 49-
55, and similar privacy-diminishing laws. However, the erosion of privacy as inherently facili-
tated by technology--the issue we are concerned with here-is not the topic of that debate.
258. Michael Froomkin, Comments to Roundtable on Code and the Public Domain at
University of Amsterdam Institute for Information Law (July 1-2, 2004).
259. See supra Part II.E.
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stance, loss of privacy may lead to discrimination in quite a few cases,
since individuals will be judged more on the sum of knowledge that peo-
ple have about them and also on group profiles with which they share
characteristics-thus, individuals will also be increasingly judged on the
basis of non-relevant bits of knowledge or presumed information. 260 It
also threatens values such as solidarity as enshrined in, among others,
European societies, for example, when patients are judged by the knowl-
edge of all their habits and predispositions, possibly leading to enormous
insurance costs for people with "bad" lifestyles or "bad" genes. Privacy
loss in situations like electronic voting may be detrimental to the democ-
ratic value of elections.
As these examples show, it is perhaps not specific individuals' horror
stories that underpin concern over privacy-eroding "code," but rather the
sum of situations in which individuals would experience loss of privacy.
Central privacy-related values are at stake if, slowly but surely, multiple
parts of daily life are becoming more transparent. An individual will feel
harmed in her integrity because she feels less an individual, less
autonomous, and less dignified when society treats her as a collection of
information fragments rather than as an integral human being. Also,
there is less scope for self-realization when there are ever fewer spheres
and situations in which one can feel unobserved (or have such a reason-
able expectation).
Moreover, one must also take into account the effects of such "code"
for society as a whole. A transparent society where everybody may know
everything about everybody else, or in which certain groups know every-
thing about other groups, is quite a different kind of society than the
essentially pluralistic and individualistic (Western) society of the early
21st century. Since society is continuously changing, this need not be a
doom scenario-we simply do not know what such a society exactly is
like-but we should be careful in embracing the prospect of such a
world with the argument that it is the natural evolution of a technology-
driven society.
In this respect, it is useful to review the precautionary principle that
is a fundamental part of environmental law. The principle says that if full
scientific certainty about the consequences of a particular activity on the
environment is lacking, while all other conditions for taking measures
are fulfilled, the (environment-protecting) measures should be taken. A
more progressive formulation of the principle determines that
precautionary measures should be taken when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that a particular activity has a detrimental effect
260. See BART H.M. CUSTERS, THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF DATA MINING AND GROUP PROFILING IN EPIDEMIOLOGY (2004).
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on the environment. The comparison of privacy with the environment
may be more apt than one might initially think, as Charles Sykes
observed: "Privacy is like oxygen. We really appreciate it only when it is
gone. 262 Privacy, like the environment, is invisible but very much a
constitutive factor of the world in which we live, and again, as is the case
with the environment, erosion of privacy is usually irreversible. This
means that individuals should not give up privacy and that precautionary
measures are called for until society knows more about the consequences
of irreversibly giving up privacy.
VII. COUNTERING THE EROSION OF PRIVACY
What precautionary measures could address the gradual erosion of
privacy through technology? Lessig suggests two pillars of tilting the
balance of privacy back again. One is commodification of personal data,
which is treating personal data as a commodity that the data subject
owns, comparable to, for example, portrait rights marketed by celebri-
ties.263 Such an approach might give people enough power over their
personal data that the risks of data merging, profiling, exclusion, and the
like can be countered. However, as Prins argues, this is ineffective:
Given that, to a large extent, individuals depend on the use of
their data and that personal data are the motor of our information
society, a move towards a legally recognized property right in
personal data will in effect not change the free public availability
and exchange of these data.26
Moreover, there are various other arguments to judge this approach inef-
fective. How can someone control a piece of personal data, once it is
sold and part of the opaque data-merging market? How could data sub-
261. See JONATHAN VERSCHUUREN, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 56 (2003);
Timothy O'Riordan et al., The Evolution of the Precautionary Principle, in REINTERPRETING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 9 (O'Riordan et al. eds., 2001); Andy Stirling, The Precau-
tionary Principle in Science and Technology, in REINTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 61; cf United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14,
2003, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/
26/Rev. 1 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992) ("In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation"), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51/aconfl 5126-1 annex 1.htm.
262. SYKES, supra note 9, at 2.
263. See LESSIG, supra note 11, at 159-62.
264. J.E.J. Prins, Property and Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodification
of our Identity, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (Lucie Guibault & PB. Hugenholtz
eds., forthcoming 2006).
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jects control their data when confronted with "take it or leave it" con-
tracts of powerful market parties? What will the administrative costs be
of paying for use of personal data, perhaps on a royalty basis? And
would such a system not require more processing of personal data in
order to pay the data royalties? In short, this approach ultimately fails.265
Could Lessig's second pillar, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
(PETs), provide such an instrument? PETs, after all, are an instrument of
control. As we have argued in the cases in the various domains, PETs by
and large seem a pet of data protection commissioners and privacy lob-
byists, but so far they do not seem to get through to others. They remain
a mainly theoretical solution that has yet to prove its effect in practice.
We discern several reasons for this: technology itself tends to combine
and connect rather than to compartmentalize; information wants to be
free rather than shielded; and governments dislike technologies they
cannot break to get information. Moreover, the people who need PETs
are usually not the ones who can decide whether they are used. And even
if they can, they are often not aware of the consequences that online
(trans)actions have for their privacy, or they are not willing to invest ex-
tra effort and money in using PETs.
Therefore, if PETs are to keep privacy alive, a conscious and con-
certed effort is needed. The market will not stimulate and use PETs by
itself; it is clear that government intervention is needed if privacy-
enhancing "code" is really to carry weight to stem and stop the gradual
erosion of privacy. Sometimes, we get a glimpse of what such interven-
tion may achieve, such as when Microsoft adapted its .Net passport
system under European pressure. 266 Another interesting, if rare, example
is the Data Protection Act 2000 of the German state of Schleswig-
Holstein, which applies to public bodies; section 4 reads:
(1) The data-processing body shall observe the principle of data
avoidance and data economy.
(2) Preference shall be given to products whose conformity with
the data protection and data security provisions have been es-
tablished by means of a formal procedure. The State
Government shall make orders regulating the content and
265. See id.; Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1283 (2000); Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace
Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 Wisc. L. REV. 743.
266. See Reidenberg, supra note 117, at 218-19.
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format of the procedure and who is authorized to carry it
out.
267
What could a government PET action plan look like? First, govern-
ments should consistently evaluate, or have others evaluate, technology
developments for their effects on privacy. Just as Dutch and American
legislation requires an "environment impact statement" to be made for
certain activities, such as major construction activities, extraction of oil,
and waste dumps, legislatures could impose an obligation to make a
"privacy impact assessment" where cases of new technologies are being
developed and marketed.
Second, there should be more binding mechanisms to respect pri-
vacy when possible and to infringe privacy only when necessary.
Although the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are enshrined
in many privacy and data-protection laws, they do not appear to have
much effect on the privacy risks of technology. As a corollary of a pri-
vacy impact assessment, a control mechanism should be established that
checks whether technologies are constructed in the most privacy-friendly
way compatible with other requirements (such as information needs and
security). We are not sure that this is entirely feasible, but it should be
possible to uncover excesses and overly intrusive technologies at least.
The control mechanism should also have some sanctioning power, like a
prohibition of government purchases of privacy-unfriendly technologies
or a power to fine companies that fail to make a privacy impact assess-
ment or that market clearly privacy-unfriendly products.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a PET action plan should raise
the awareness levels of citizens, consumers, enterprises, government
agencies, as well as technology developers. Raising awareness of privacy
risks with citizens and consumers is, in fact, a crucial first-step to stop-
ping the downward spiral of privacy erosion that is partly a result of
privacy myopia. Only if people are aware that there is a "death of pri-
vacy" afoot and what this means for their future can (perhaps) a
sufficient amount of leverage be established that can start to check the
natural privacy-eroding tendency of technology.
267. Unabhangiges Landeszentrum fuir Datenschutz Schleswig-Holstein [State Data
Protection Act, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany], Gs SCHL.-H. II, 204 GL.NR. 4 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/material/recht/ldsg-neuldsg-n-e.htm.
